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THE UNIFIED FIELD SOLUTION TO THE BATTLE OF THE
FORMS UNDER THE U.N. SALES CONVENTION
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INTRODUCTION
Ours is not an age of nuance. Simple and certain answers are the
preferred course, the more so for complicated questions. But human
affairs do not come in neat little boxes, and most forms of human
interaction are messy, complicated, and idiosyncratic. The station
of the law nonetheless is to distill commonalities, draw lines, and
craft generally applicable norms of conduct. The problem is that as
the subject of regulation grows in complexity and diversity, the
ability of the law to make just generalizations decreases. And many
fields of human activity reflect a true spectrum, such that certain
rules and rigid categories cannot begin to capture the nuanced
reality.
The challenges are even greater for relations and transactions
that cross international borders. In this realm, differences in
culture, language, practice, and jurisprudential perspective (among
many others) make interjurisdictional generalizations exceedingly
difficult. To make matters worse, each sovereign jurisdiction will
have legal rules tailored to local values and customs. The resultant
conflicts in national law can create existential uncertainties for
international commercial (and other) transactions.
The first-order solution to this problem is an international treaty
that creates a self-contained body of uniform law for all member
states. Thankfully, such a treaty exists for the subject of our inquiry
here: the international sale of goods. This treaty, the United
Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods
(the Convention or CISG),1 both covers the most significant form of
international commercial transactions and is itself the most successful effort in history to unify international commercial law.2 Over
ninety countries have ratified the treaty, including the United
States in 1986.3 In this country, the CISG also functions as a “self1. United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Apr. 11,
1980, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 98-9, 1489 U.N.T.S. 3 [hereinafter CISG].
2. See infra Part I.C.
3. For a full list of the states that have ratified or otherwise acceded to the Convention,
see Status: United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods
(Vienna, 1980) (CISG), U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE L. [hereinafter Status: United Nations
Convention], https://uncitral.un.org/en/texts/salegoods/conventions/sale_of_goods/cisg/status
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executing treaty,” which takes immediate and direct effect as
supreme federal law without further action by Congress.4
The CISG broadly regulates not only the substantive rights of
buyers and sellers, but also how parties form international sale
contracts in the first place.5 In practical terms, the latter subject is
substantially more important, for in many—perhaps most—cases
the process of contract formation is dispositive. The simple reason
is that any enterprise of even modest sophistication will engage
lawyers to prepare a set of comprehensive, one-sided standard
business terms, and then will insist that those terms govern in all
of its transactions.6 If, then, a legal system’s formation rules
validate such an effort, the party can be assured of total victory. The
problem is that the other party will have done the same and will
have no desire to contract except on the basis of its own one-sided,
all-inclusive terms.7 The common consequence is a “battle of the
forms.”8
Unfortunately, in the charged political environment of the 1970s,9
the drafters of the CISG simply were unable to agree on the rules to
govern this common situation.10 The result over the last three
decades, not surprisingly, has been substantial judicial confusion
and substantial scholarly controversy.11 Indeed, because standard
contract terms almost always contain a forum selection clause,
courts commonly confront the argument that they do not even have
the authority to hear a CISG dispute.12 And as a practical matter,
the answer to this question often is the entire game, for the cost and
hassle of litigating in a distant and unfamiliar foreign court may
[https://perma.cc/X9PX-ULTX]. For more on this point, see infra Part I.C.
4. For more on this important point, see infra Part I.A.
5. CISG, supra note 1, art. 4.
6. See infra Part II.B.
7. See infra Part II.B.
8. See U.N. COMM’N ON INT’L TRADE L., UNCITRAL DIGEST OF CASE LAW ON THE UNITED
NATIONS CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS, art. 19, para.
6, at 98-99 (2016) [hereinafter UNCITRAL DIGEST], https://www.uncitral.org/pdf/
english/clout/CISG_Digest_2016.pdf [https://perma.cc/X29V-9A7H].
9. See Clayton P. Gillette & Robert E. Scott, The Political Economy of International Sales
Law, 25 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 446, 449-52 (2005).
10. See UNCITRAL DIGEST, supra note 8; infra notes 106-10 and accompanying text.
11. See infra Part II.C.
12. See, e.g., Turfworthy, LLC v. Dr. Karl Wetekam & Co., 26 F. Supp. 3d 496, 500-01
(M.D.N.C. 2014).
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mean that the fight is not worth the candle. This amply explains
why by far the most common subject of U.S. court opinions on the
CISG is the effect of forum selection clauses.13
The short of the matter is that the most important issue on the
most important commercial law treaty is also subject to the most
enduring controversy. The debate among courts and scholars
generally has distilled into two opposing “camps”: one that prizes
structural simplicity and results in total victory (the “last shot” rule)
and one that prefers a simple division of rights (the “knock out”
rule).14 More than two decades ago, I engaged in this debate through
a lengthy law review article15 and a book in the German language.16
Some legal insights, however, require time for marinating, for
essential truths to distill through clouds of complexity and uncertainty. I now return to take stock of intervening developments and
indeed to refine my own thinking. Reasoned reflection, with the
benefit of time and insights from judicial struggles, now reveals that
the proper analysis requires substantially more nuance than is
reflected in either of the traditional approaches to the battle of the
forms.
This Article begins by explaining the significance of the project.
Part I sets the foundation by describing the CISG’s broad influence
on international trade as well as its special status in the United
States as directly enforceable, supreme federal law. Part II then
examines the CISG’s basic contract formation scheme, and how the
drafters’ failure to address standard business terms left a structural
flaw in the system. It then reviews the two leading approaches to

13. See, e.g., Hellenic Petroleum LLC v. Elbow River Mktg. Ltd., No. 1:19-cv-00483-LJOSKO, 2019 WL 6114892, at *2 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 18, 2019); Allied Dynamics Corp. v.
Kennametal, Inc., No. 12-CV-5904(JFB)(AKT), 2014 WL 3845244, at *11 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 5,
2014); Turfworthy, 26 F. Supp. 3d at 503; CSS Antenna, Inc. v. Amphenol-Tuchel Elecs.,
GmbH, 764 F. Supp. 2d 745, 752-54 (D. Md. 2011). For further examples and a more detailed
analysis of the subject, see infra Part I.D.
14. See UNCITRAL DIGEST, supra note 8, art. 19, para. 6, at 98-99; see also Kasper
Steensgaard, A Comparative View on ‘Battle of the Forms’ Under the CISG and in the German
and US American Experiences, 2015 NORDIC J. COM. L. 1, 3 (Den.).
15. Michael P. Van Alstine, Consensus, Dissensus, and Contractual Obligation Through
the Prism of Uniform International Sales Law, 37 VA. J. INT’L L. 1, 76-90 (1996).
16. MICHAEL P. VAN ALSTINE, FEHLENDER KONSENS BEIM VERTRAGSABSCHLUß NACH DEM
EINHEITLICHEN UN-KAUFRECHT [ABSENCE OF AGREEMENT UPON CONTRACT FORMATION UNDER
THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION ON INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW] (1995).
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this issue (last shot and knock out) that have coalesced over the
thirty-plus years since the CISG entered into force in 1988.
Part III examines the truly impressive work of U.S. courts in
analyzing the CISG’s principles for determining party intent.
Properly attracted by the “gravitational pull of uniformity,”17 these
courts have recognized that—in marked contrast with traditional
common law notions—the CISG requires a flexible, thoroughgoing
search for a party’s actual intent. Of equal consequence, they have
seen that this has direct consequences for the treatment of standard
business terms. I then explain that these twin developments provide
an unnoticed foundation for a more sophisticated approach to the
broader issue of the battle of the forms.
The analytical payoff comes in Part IV. The goal of this Part is no
less than to provide a comprehensive, indeed definitive, solution to
the enduring controversy over the battle of the forms under the
CISG. To be sure, the CISG’s express offer-acceptance provisions set
the basic structure. But as I explain, two “formation values” provide
the principles that unify the system.18 The first is that the parties’
actual agreement takes priority even over the express provisions of
the Convention (“party autonomy”).19 The second is a directive that,
as a primary goal, a court seek out and give effect to the parties’
actual intent. Together, these formation values provide the flexible
norms that permit courts to apply traditional modes of legal
analysis across the full, diverse array of battle of the forms cases.
The flaw in the two leading approaches to this issue under the
Convention, as Part IV next explains, is that they fail to accommodate the complicated reality of modern international contracting.
It is not that the last shot and knock out views are misguided in all
respects. Rather, the problem is that each proceeds from a stylized
assumption about how parties express contractual assent, but then
wrongly seeks to apply that assumption beyond its narrow terrain.
Seen in this way, the two views in fact are not in competition (at
least not fully); rather, they simply focus on different points—different subsets of cases—along the same range of factual circumstances. It is as if the two have not recognized that they are
17. See infra Part III.A.
18. See infra Part IV.A.
19. See infra notes 66-68 and accompanying text.
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residents of the same country because they have been too busy
surveying the features of its distant coasts.
A refined understanding of the battle of the forms instead begins
with a recognition that the subject matter is not a phenomenon, but
rather a spectrum. Like most forms of human affairs, the interactions of international buyers and sellers come in a diverse array of
forms, types, and practices. At one end of the factual spectrum, a
party’s standard business terms may prevail by express agreement;
at the other, no principled reason will exist to prefer the interests of
one party over those of the other. For the vast range of cases in
between, however, no rigid, one-size-fits-all rule can remotely
capture the complex reality of actual business deals.
The proper solution instead is to be found in the core values that
unify the Convention’s contract formation scheme. These formation
values permit, indeed require, a flexible approach that is comprehensive in scope, but individualized in application. With a nod to
physics, I describe this approach as the “unified field solution”—for
it incorporates the existing theories (each in its own domain), but
also recognizes that a single set of principles applies across the full
spectrum of agreement processes.20 The final Section of Part IV then
analyzes this unified field solution in action. It does so by applying
the Convention’s flexible formation values across an array of
standard transaction types in modern battles of the forms. But as
I emphasize there, these categories are merely an expedient for
analysis, and should not divert attention from the essential concept
of a spectrum.
***
The most fundamental principle of contract law is that the parties
may define for themselves the scope of their contractual commitments. Unfortunately, the modern phenomenon of standard contract
20. Coined by Albert Einstein, the term “unified field theory” describes the attempt to
“reconcile seemingly incompatible aspects” of existing theories under a single, comprehensive
set of principles that can explain the full range of physical phenomena. Parashu Ram Poudel,
Unified Field Theory, 4 HIMALAYAN PHYSICS 87, 87 (2013). In specific, it seeks to unify the
broad theory of gravitation (as part of Einstein’s theory of general relativity) with the
Standard Model, which describes the nature of and relationships between the smallest scales
of physics. Id. at 89-90. For an introduction to the concept, see generally id.
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terms scrambles this principle in operation—for their very purpose
is total victory without formal agreement. In practice, however, the
dynamics of achieving agreement are varied, complicated, and often
obscure. Nonetheless, in a system founded on fidelity to the parties’
actual intent, the uncertainty driven by this diversity should not be
wished away through simple suppositions. Rather, the solution is to
apply flexible interpretive norms that are capable of accommodating
the nuanced reality of actual contractual deals.
I. THE U.N. SALES CONVENTION: A “MILESTONE IN LEGAL HISTORY”
A. The Convention as Supreme Federal Law
The U.N. Sales Convention holds a particularly powerful place in
the hierarchy of legal norms in the United States. In our federal
system, matters of contract and commercial law generally fall
within the lawmaking competence of the individual states.21 For
international sales transactions, however, the Convention—also
known, even internationally, by the initialism CISG—fundamentally changes this allocation of authority.
The CISG takes the legal form of an international treaty. Article
II, Section 2, of the Constitution grants to the President, “by and
with the Advice and Consent” of a supermajority of the Senate, the
power to conclude binding treaties on behalf of the United States.22
This is precisely what occurred with the CISG. Representatives of
the State Department negotiated the treaty in the 1970s under the
auspices of the United Nations Commission on International Trade
Law (UNCITRAL).23 Upon completion, the Reagan administration

21. See, e.g., Amelia H. Boss, The Future of the Uniform Commercial Code Process in an
Increasingly International World, 68 OHIO ST. L.J. 349, 376 (2007) (examining the
implications of internationalization in areas of “traditional state competence ... such as ...
commercial law”); Larry D. Kramer, Putting the Politics Back into the Political Safeguards of
Federalism, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 215, 220 (2000) (explaining that the private law of contract,
property, and tort traditionally has fallen within the lawmaking authority of the states).
22. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2 (providing that the President “shall have Power, by and with
the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators
present concur”).
23. For a review of this history, see Peter Winship, Congress and the 1980 International
Sales Convention, 16 GA. J. INT'L & COMP. L. 707, 710-16 (1986).
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obtained the “advice and consent” of the Senate in October 1986,24
and the President declared the treaty’s ratification in December of
the same year.25 The CISG then entered into force on January 1,
1988, after the ratifications of the United States, China, and Italy
exceeded the defined threshold of ten member states.26
Although law schools often fail to teach the point, the Supremacy
Clause in Article VI of the Constitution declares that treaties made
under the authority of the United States—just like statutes and the
Constitution itself—are the “supreme Law of the Land.”27 To clear
away any doubt, the same provision obligates “the Judges in every
State” to give effect to treaties notwithstanding “any Thing in the
Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary.”28 Like other
forms of federal law, therefore, a treaty has the power to preempt
state law (and even other, earlier-in-time federal statutes) for
matters within its scope.29
Indeed, the U.N. Sales Convention takes the most powerful form
of an international treaty, for it is “self-executing.” As the Supreme
Court declared in the landmark case of Foster v. Neilson nearly two
centuries ago, a treaty of this type “operates of itself” and thus takes
immediate and direct effect as binding federal law without further
action by Congress.30 And from their earliest engagements with the
24. Id. at 707.
25. See U.S. Ratification of 1980 United Nations Convention on Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods: Official English Text, 52 Fed. Reg. 6262 (Mar. 2, 1987). On a
purely terminological note, one might wish that courts would stop referring to the United
States as a “signatory” to the CISG. See, e.g., Jae Yeon Textile Inc. v. AKM Textile Inc., No.
CV16-0534 19SJO (JEMx), 2017 WL 7156244, at *3 (C.D. Cal. Nov. 27, 2017); Nucap Indus.,
Inc. v. Robert Bosch LLC, 273 F. Supp. 3d 986, 1005 (N.D. Ill. 2017). This is both true and
irrelevant regarding the legal force of the CISG. Under international law, the signing of a
treaty simply signifies an agreement on the final text (subject to certain nuances). See Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 10, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331 (entered into
force Jan. 27, 1980). Under the Constitution, the United States becomes bound to a treaty not
when the President signs it, but rather when the Senate gives its consent under Article II,
Section 2, and the President then declares the formal ratification. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2,
cl. 2.
26. See CISG, supra note 1, art. 99(1); Status: United Nations Convention, supra note 3.
27. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
28. Id.
29. The Supreme Court has recognized this so-called later-in-time rule since the 1800s.
See, e.g., Whitney v. Robertson, 124 U.S. 190, 194 (1888) (observing that when a self-executing
treaty conflicts with a federal statute, “the one last in date will control”).
30. 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 253, 314 (1829), overruled on other grounds by United States v.
Percheman, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 51, 52 (1833); see also Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 504-05
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question, federal courts quite properly have recognized that the
CISG is a “self-executing treaty with the preemptive force of federal
law.”31
Moreover, the Convention creates a private right of action
enforceable in courts in the United States.32 Such claims also “arise
under” a treaty under Article III, Section 2, of the U.S. Constitution33 and thus fall within the jurisdiction of federal courts under
28 U.S.C. § 1331.34 Federal courts thus have not merely the power
but the constitutional responsibility to enforce the substantive
rights recognized in the CISG.35 This responsibility is all the more

(2008) (describing self-executing treaties as ones that “automatically have effect as domestic
law”); Whitney, 124 U.S. at 194 (holding that a self-executing treaty has the same “force and
effect [as] a legislative enactment”). For a broader review of the history and controversies
surrounding the self-execution doctrine, see Michael P. Van Alstine, Federal Common Law
in an Age of Treaties, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 892, 900-17 (2004); see also Martin S. Flaherty,
History Right?: Historical Scholarship, Original Understanding, and Treaties as “Supreme
Law of the Land,” 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2095, 2128-38 (1999); Carlos Manuel Vázquez, Laughing
at Treaties, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 2154, 2181-94 (1999); John C. Yoo, Globalism and the
Constitution: Treaties, Non-Self-Execution, and the Original Understanding, 99 COLUM. L.
REV. 1955, 2075-94 (1999).
31. It’s Intoxicating, Inc. v. Maritim Hotelgesellschaft mbH, No. 11-CV-2379, 2013 WL
3973975, at *16 (M.D. Pa. July 31, 2013) (quoting Am. Mint LLC v. GOSoftware, Inc., No.
1:05-CV-650, 2005 WL 2021248, at *2 (M.D. Penn. Aug. 16, 2005)); see also, e.g., Target Corp.
v. JJS Devs. Ltd., No. 16-cv-1184 (JNE/TNL), 2018 WL 809587, at *3 (D. Minn. Feb. 9, 2018);
Honey Holdings I, Ltd. v. Alfred L. Wolff, Inc., 81 F. Supp. 3d 543, 551-52 (S.D. Tex. 2015);
Hanwha Corp. v. Cedar Petrochemicals, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 2d 426, 430 (S.D.N.Y. 2011). The
progenitor of this line of authority is Delchi Carrier SpA v. Rotorex Corp., 71 F.3d 1024, 1027
n.1 (2d Cir. 1995).
32. See, e.g., Zodiac Seats US LLC v. Synergy Aerospace Corp., No. 4:17-cv-00410-ALMKPJ, 2019 WL 1776960, at *2 (E.D. Tex. Apr. 23, 2019); D&G Grp., S.R.I. v. H.A. Import USA,
No. 14-CV-2850 (TPG), 2015 WL 694925, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Feb. 18, 2015); Honey Holdings, 81
F. Supp. 3d at 551-52; Citgo Petroleum Corp. v. Odfjell Seachem, No. H-07-2950, 2013 WL
2289951, at *4 (S.D. Tex. May 23, 2013).
33. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (“The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law
and Equity, arising under ... Treaties made, or which shall be made, under [the authority of
the United States].”).
34. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (providing that district courts have original jurisdiction of actions
“arising under ... treaties”). For a recent application of this point, see Ningbo Yang Voyage
Textiles Co. v. Sault Trading, No. 18-CV-1961 (ARR) (ST), 2019 WL 5399973, at *2 (E.D.N.Y.
Sept. 10, 2019).
35. I have elsewhere comprehensively examined the obligation of federal courts to enforce
rights set forth in self-executing treaties. See Michael P. Van Alstine, The Death of Good Faith
in Treaty Jurisprudence and a Call for Resurrection, 93 GEO. L.J. 1885, 1892-1902 (2005).

2020]

THE UNIFIED FIELD SOLUTION

223

significant because, as an international treaty, the CISG represents
sovereign obligations of the United States under international law.36
The next three Sections explore why the status of the CISG as
directly applicable, supreme federal law is so fundamentally
important for the subject of our inquiry here. The first two (Sections
B and C) briefly review the substantive scope of the CISG as well as
its broad international influence.37 The most important point,
however, is found in the final Section and is worthy of distillation
upfront: it is a commonly held vanity, even by parties with sophisticated legal teams, that a party can avoid application of the CISG by
clever drafting of choice-of-law and choice-of-forum clauses. We will
see in Section D, however, that because the CISG applies “by its
own self-executing force,”38 the CISG’s formation rules will determine whether a party’s preferred terms become part of a contract at
all—and standard business terms, however cleverly drafted, cannot
avoid that result.39
B. Scope and Significance
The CISG’s sphere of application has been extensively analyzed
in treatises40 and court opinions41 and thus need not detain us long.
Nonetheless, a brief review is necessary to set the foundation for the
analysis to follow.

36. Id. at 1900 (“Through the express inclusion of treaties within Article III, the Framers
determined to confer on the federal courts the responsibility to ensure fidelity to the domesticlaw incidents of the nation’s international treaty obligations.”).
37. See infra Parts I.B-C.
38. Hanwha Corp. v. Cedar Petrochemicals, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 2d 426, 431 (S.D.N.Y.
2011).
39. See infra Part I.D.
40. See, e.g., RALPH H. FOLSOM, MICHAEL WALLACE GORDON, MICHAEL P. VAN ALSTINE &
MICHAEL D. RAMSAY, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS § 2.4, at 48-55
(4th ed. 2017); Ingeborg Schwenzer & Pascal Hachem, Article 1, in COMMENTARY ON THE UN
CONVENTION ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (CISG) 27 (Ingeborg Schwenzer ed., 4th
ed. 2016).
41. For recent examples, see Ningbo Yang Voyage Textiles Co. v. Sault Trading, No. 18CV-1961 (ARR) (ST), 2019 WL 5399973, at *2 (E.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 2019); Zodiac Seats US LLC
v. Synergy Aerospace Corp., No. 4:17-cv-00410-ALM-KPJ, 2019 WL 1776960, at *2 (E.D. Tex.
Apr. 23, 2019); Target Corp. v. JJS Devs. Ltd., No. 16-cv-1184 (JNE/TNL), 2018 WL 809587,
at *3 (D. Minn. Feb. 9, 2018).
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Three elements define the substantive scope of the Convention.
First, the subject of the transaction must be a “sale” of “goods.”42
Although the Convention does not define these terms, the accepted
view is that they mean the transfer of ownership of a thing (that is,
something with a physical existence) in return for the payment of a
price (that is, money).43 Second, and most important, the sale of
goods transaction must be “international” as contemplated by CISG
Article 1(1).44 A transaction satisfies this core concept if the parties
have their respective “places of business” in different states and if
either (a) both of these states have ratified or otherwise acceded to
the Convention (which the CISG, somewhat misleadingly, refers to
as “Contracting States”45), or (b) the conflict-of-law rules of the
forum court—known by the civil law term “rules of private international law”—lead to the application of the law of just one Contracting State.46 (The latter option does not apply in U.S. courts,
however, because upon ratification the United States declared an
allowed reservation to that effect.)47 Finally, the parties must have
concluded the contract at issue after the relevant state or states
ratified the Convention.48
The significant point here is that if a transaction satisfies this
test, the CISG applies directly and of its own force.49 In the United
42. See CISG, supra note 1, art. 1(1).
43. See FOLSOM ET AL., supra note 40, § 2.4, at 49-50; Schwenzer & Hachem, supra note
40, at 30.
44. See CISG, supra note 1, art. 1(1). For a broader examination of this requirement, see
FOLSOM ET AL., supra note 40, § 2.4, at 50-53; Loukas Mistelis, Article 1, in UN CONVENTION
ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (CISG) 21, 33-38 (Stefan Kröll et al.
eds., 2011).
45. See CISG, supra note 1, art. 1(1)(a) (using this term).
46. See CISG, supra note 1, art. 1(1); Mistelis, supra note 44, at 37-38; Schwenzer &
Hachem, supra note 40, at 38-42.
47. See CISG, supra note 1, art. 95 (“Any State may declare ... that it will not be bound
by subparagraph (1)(b) of article 1 of this Convention.”); S. TREATY DOC. NO. 98-9, at V-VI, 2122 (1983); see also FOLSOM ET AL., supra note 40, § 2.4, at 54-55 (examining the significance
of this reservation for the United States).
48. See CISG, supra note 1, art. 100. If the issue is one of formation, the relevant event
in this regard is when the offeror made the proposal for concluding a contract. Id.
49. See, e.g., Shantou Real Lingerie Mfg. Co. v. Native Grp. Int’l, Ltd., No. 14cv10246FM, 2016 WL 4532911, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2016) (observing that the CISG “automatically applies to international sales contracts between parties from different contracting
states” (quoting Cedar Petrochemicals, Inc. v. Dongbu Hannong Chem. Co., No. 06 Civ. 3972
(LTS)(JCF), 2011 WL 4494602, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2011))); Weihai Textile Grp. Imp. &
Exp. Co. v. Level 8 Apparel, LLC, No. 11 Civ. 4405(ALC)(FM), 2014 WL 1494327, at *6
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States, as we have seen, this follows from the Convention’s status
as a “self-executing treaty” under Article VI of the Constitution.50
The result is that the CISG “supersedes state law,”51 and thus broadly preempts both state common law and the Uniform Commercial
Code (UCC).52
The adverb “broadly” here has bite, for the eighty-eight substantive articles of the Convention govern nearly all aspects of the
relationship between a buyer and seller in international sales
transactions within its scope. First, it defines nearly the entirety of
the substantive rights and obligations of the parties to such transactions.53 Moreover, and more important for present purposes, it
provides the rules that govern contract formation in the first place.54
Thus, courts must look to the rules in the Convention to determine
whether the parties have formed a contract at all and, if so, what
terms are in that contract.55 This, as noted above and as explored in
more detail below,56 has profound implications for the now-pervasive
practice of employing preformulated, standard business terms in
contract negotiations.
C. The Convention’s Influence on International Trade
The significance of the U.N. Sales Convention also is revealed by
its influence on international trade. Although a bit peripheral to my

(S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2014) (same); Zhejiang Shaoxing Yongli Printing & Dyeing Co. v.
Microflock Textile Grp. Corp., No. 06-22608-CIV, 2008 WL 2098062, at *2 (S.D. Fla. May 19,
2008) (same).
50. See supra notes 21-31 and accompanying text.
51. VLM Food Trading Int’l, Inc. v. Ill. Trading Co., 748 F.3d 780, 787 (7th Cir. 2014).
52. See, e.g., Yosemite Auto (Shanghai) Co. v. JRS Metals, Inc., No. 4:15-CV-1641, 2016
WL 4441543, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 23, 2016); Am. Mint LLC v. GOSoftware, Inc., No. Civ. A.
1:05-CV-650, 2005 WL 2021248, at *2 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 16, 2005). By its own terms, the
Convention does not apply, however, to certain defined categories of transactions (most
importantly those with consumers). See CISG, supra note 1, art. 2.
53. See CISG, supra note 1, arts. 25-88. This is subject to certain express exclusions
defined in the Convention itself. See, e.g., id. art. 4(a)-(b) (providing that the Convention does
not govern “[t]he validity of the contract or of any of its provisions or of any usage” or property
rights); id. art. 5 (“This Convention does not apply to the liability of the seller for death or
personal injury caused by the goods.”).
54. See CISG, supra note 1, arts. 14-24.
55. See id.
56. See infra Part I.D.
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core purpose here, a few words on this background point will reinforce the value of the overall project.
As of 2020, ninety-three countries have ratified or otherwise
acceded to the Convention.57 These “Contracting States” represent
all geographic regions, all political perspectives, and all stages of
economic development, and include (nearly) all of the most important trading countries on earth (for example, the United States,
China, Germany, Japan, France, and South Korea).58
Collectively, the CISG’s member states account for over 80
percent of the global trade in goods59 (according to the most recent
statistics, more than $18 trillion in total).60 Moreover, the economies
of these countries make up over 72 percent of world gross domestic
product.61 And, as we have seen,62 the CISG can apply even if only
one party has its place of business in a Contracting State.63 These
facts show that the CISG arguably is the most successful effort in
history to unify international private law; they abundantly validate
the statement by a German scholar in 1989 that the Convention’s
entry into force represented a “milestone in legal history.”64
D. Misplaced Faith in Choice-of-Law and Choice-of-Forum
Clauses
From its very nature, the U.N. Sales Convention, like most other
legal norms in the field of commercial law, represents a body of socalled default rules. That is, as I explain in more detail below, the
57. See Status: United Nations Convention, supra note 3.
58. The most notable exceptions are the United Kingdom, Ireland, Indonesia, and India.
See id.
59. Ingeborg Schwenzer, Introduction to COMMENTARY ON THE UN CONVENTION ON THE
INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (CISG), supra note 40, at 1, 1.
60. Top Exporters and Importers 2018, WORLD INTEGRATED TRADE SOL., https://wits.
worldbank.org/CountryProfile/en/Country/WLD/Year/2018/TradeFlow/EXPIMP/Partner/byregion [https://perma.cc/VL5A-8KD8].
61. This is based on purchasing power parity statistics from the International Monetary
Fund (data on file with Author).
62. See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
63. As noted above, in U.S. courts the CISG applies only if both the buyer and the seller
have their relevant places of business in a CISG Contracting State. See supra note 48 and
accompanying text.
64. ROLAN LOEWE, INTERNATIONALES KAUFRECHT 5 (1989) (“Markstein der Rechtsgeschichte”).
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CISG’s provisions operate in the background of the parties’ actual
agreement and thus are subject to exclusion or modification at the
will of the parties. Herein lies, however, a serious risk of misdirection. Indeed, there is perhaps no greater myth than the idea that a
party may render the entirety of the CISG irrelevant simply by
including a corresponding clause in its standard business terms.
Readers of this work hardly need to be schooled on the prevalence
and significance of standard business terms in modern commerce.65
These standard business terms are an expedient contracting vehicle
in long-term relationships—such as structured “supply chain”
arrangements—or where one party has a dominant bargaining
position. But for all other deals, the formal rules of law (as found in
the CISG for nearly all international sales) will determine whether
and to what extent a party’s proposed terms actually apply in a
contractual relationship with another party.
To be sure, the CISG itself empowers the parties to an international sales transaction to “opt out” of its application.66 Specifically,
and as a reflection of the elemental principle of “party autonomy,”67
CISG Article 6 provides that “[t]he parties may exclude the
application of this Convention.”68 Thus, the parties have the power
to declare that the CISG will not govern their transaction at all and
instead choose the law of a specific domestic legal system.69 Indeed,
the same provision empowers the parties more generally to
“derogate from or vary the effect of any of its provisions.”70 This is
a direct statement that the very nature of the CISG is, as a set of
default rules, subject to displacement by the agreement of the

65. For a more detailed examination of the force and effect of standard business terms,
see infra Part II.B.
66. See, e.g., Nucap Indus., Inc. v. Robert Bosch LLC, 273 F. Supp. 3d 986, 1005 (N.D. Ill.
2017); Orica Austl. Pty. Ltd. v. Aston Evaporative Servs., LLC, No. 14-cv-0412-WJM-CBS,
2015 WL 4538534, at *4 (D. Colo. July 28, 2015); Cedar Petrochemicals, Inc. v. Dongbu
Hannong Chem. Co., No. 06 Civ. 3972(LTS)(JCF), 2011 WL 4494602, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept.
28, 2011).
67. See FOLSOM ET AL., supra note 40, § 2.5, at 57; Ingeborg Schwenzer & Pascal Hachem,
Article 6, in COMMENTARY ON THE UN CONVENTION ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS
(CISG), supra note 40, at 101, 103-04.
68. CISG, supra note 1, art. 6.
69. See FOLSOM ET AL., supra note 40, § 2.5, at 55-57; Schwenzer & Hachem, supra note
40, at 111-13.
70. CISG, supra note 1, art. 6.
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parties.71 In the words of one Belgian court, “the contract precedes
the CISG in the hierarchy of rules.”72
Unfortunately, this power of party autonomy in Article 6 has
founded a quite prevalent myth that a party may exclude the
Convention simply by including a choice-of-law clause in its
standard business terms.73 Indeed, for unclear reasons—perhaps
simple ignorance or discomfort with the unknown—many U.S.
companies reflexively include in their standard business terms a
clause declaring an exclusion of the CISG.74 They then bolster this
with a choice-of-forum clause.75 Generally endorsed in Supreme
Court precedent,76 the purpose of these latter clauses is to require
that all future disputes are heard by familiar, local, and presumably
more sympathetic courts.77 It should thus not surprise that such
clauses have played a prominent role in both U.S. and foreign courts
in cases involving the contract formation rules of the CISG.78 If a
71. See FOLSOM ET AL., supra note 40, § 2.5, at 55 (“The agreements of the parties ... take
precedence over the provisions of the CISG.”); Loukas Mistelis, Article 6, in UN CONVENTION
ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (CISG), supra note 44, at 99, 101
(“The CISG has a dispositive character so that contracting parties may derogate from or
exclude its application.” (footnotes omitted)).
72. Hof van Beroep [HvB] [Court of Appeal] Antwerpen, Apr. 24, 2006, 2002/AR/2087,
translation at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/060424b1.html [https://perma.cc/Y86U-9LV2].
73. The importance of the choice-of-law question is fundamentally different as between
the domestic UCC and the CISG. Because the UCC is uniform throughout the United States
(subject to small issues of interpretation), which state’s law applies rarely is of significance.
See John F. Coyle, The Role of the CISG in U.S. Contract Practice: An Empirical Study, 38 U.
PA. J. INT’L L. 195, 237 (2016). The CISG, in contrast, resulted from numerous compromises
among divergent legal and political perspectives and thus may differ in fundamental respects
from the domestic law of any particular country. See Alejandro M. Garro, Reconciliation of
Legal Traditions in the U.N. Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 23
INT’L L. 443, 450-52 (1989).
74. See Coyle, supra note 73, at 216-20.
75. See infra note 78 and accompanying text.
76. The Supreme Court declared this principle in Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co., 407
U.S. 1, 10, 15 (1972) (holding that a forum selection clause is “prima facie valid” and “should
control absent a strong showing that it should be set aside”). For recent examples, see Azima
v. RAK Inv. Auth., 926 F.3d 870, 874 (D.C. Cir. 2019); Barnett v. DynCorp Int’l, L.L.C., 831
F.3d 296 (5th Cir. 2016).
77. See Coyle, supra note 73, at 237.
78. See, e.g., Hellenic Petroleum LLC v. Elbow River Mktg. Ltd., No. 1:19-cv-00483-LJOSKO, 2019 WL 6114892, at *1 (E.D. Cal. Nov. 18, 2019); Allied Dynamics Corp. v.
Kennametal, Inc., No. 12-CV-5904(JFB)(AKT), 2014 WL 3845244, at *11 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 5,
2014); Turfworthy, LLC v. Dr. Karl Wetekam & Co., 26 F. Supp. 3d 496, 503 (M.D.N.C. 2014);
CSS Antenna, Inc. v. Amphenol-Tuchel Elecs., GmbH, 764 F. Supp. 2d 745, 751-54 (D. Md.
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choice-of-forum clause is effective, so the (wishful) thinking goes, the
court hearing the dispute does not have the authority even to
determine whether the CISG applies in the first place.
To put the point politely, the faith in choice-of-law and choice-offorum clauses is very much misplaced. First, the now-established
(and correct) view in the courts is that an effective exclusion
requires a clear and affirmative agreement that mentions the CISG
by name; as a result, a mere choice of the law of a particular domestic jurisdiction does not suffice.79 As the Fifth Circuit observed in a
case involving an agreed choice of Ecuadorian law (a CISG member
state), “[g]iven that the CISG is Ecuadorian law, a choice of law
provision designating Ecuadorian law merely confirms that the
treaty governs the transaction.”80
More important, the premise for a unilateral exclusion of the
CISG dissolves upon even brief scrutiny. We may begin simply by
2011); Belcher-Robinson, L.L.C. v. Linamar Corp., 699 F. Supp. 2d 1329, 1336-38 (M.D. Ala.
2010); Golden Valley Grape Juice & Wine, LLC v. Centrisys Corp., No. CV F 09-1424 LJO
GSA, 2010 WL 347897, at *3-4 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 2010); BTC-USA Corp. v. Novacare, No.
07-3998 ADM/JSM, 2008 WL 2465814, at *2-4 (D. Minn. June 16, 2008); Solae, LLC v.
Hershey Can., Inc., 557 F. Supp. 2d 452, 456-58 (D. Del. 2008). The same issue commonly
arises in foreign courts. See, e.g., Hanseatic Higher Regional Court [OLG], July 15, 2010,
13 U 54/10 (Ger.), translation at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/100715g1.html [https://
perma.cc/K69P-6BVH]; Trib., 24 agosto 2006, n. 1537/05 2006 (It.), translation at http://
cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/060824i3.html [https://perma.cc/9CMK-L3FG].
79. See, e.g., Nucap Indus., Inc. v. Robert Bosch LLC, 273 F. Supp. 3d 986, 1005 (N.D. Ill.
2017) (holding that if a clause merely chooses the law of a particular state, the analysis
“would circle back to the CISG because ... the CISG preempts inconsistent state law on
contract formation” (citing Remy, Inc. v. Tecnomatic, S.p.A., No. 1:08-cv-1227-SEB-WGH,
2010 WL 4174594, at *1 (S.D. Ind. Oct. 18, 2010))); Honey Holdings I, Ltd. v. Alfred L. Wolff,
Inc., 81 F. Supp. 3d 543, 552 (S.D. Tex. 2015) (“To apply the domestic law of the United States
rather than the CISG, the parties must ‘affirmatively opt-out of the CISG’ and show a ‘clear
intent’ to do so. Merely designating a choice of law is insufficient, without more, to show a
clear intent to opt-out.” (internal citation omitted) (quoting BP Oil Int’l, Ltd. v. Empresa
Estatal Petroleos de Ecuador, 332 F.3d 333, 337 (5th Cir. 2003))); It’s Intoxicating, Inc. v.
Maritim Hotelgesellschaft mbH, No. 11-CV-2379, 2013 WL 3973975, at *16 (M.D. Pa. July 31,
2013) (“[A] choice of law provision, to be effective, must not only select the law that will apply
but affirmatively state that the CISG will not apply to the contract.” (citing Am. Mint LLC v.
GOSoftware, Inc., No. 1:05-CV-650, 2005 WL 2021248, at *3 (M.D. Pa. Aug. 16, 2005)));
Microgem Corp. v. Homecast Co., No. 10 Civ. 3330(RJS), 2012 WL 1608709, at *2-3 (S.D.N.Y.
Apr. 27, 2012) (holding that a contract’s choice of New York law did not exclude the CISG
because “[s]tating only that a contract will be governed by a particular jurisdiction’s laws is
generally insufficient to opt-out of the CISG when the CISG has been incorporated into that
jurisdiction’s laws”).
80. Empresa Estatal Petroleos de Ecuador, 332 F.3d at 337.
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revisiting the text of CISG Article 6: the power to exclude the CISG
recognized there is granted to “the parties” (in the plural).81 The
common label of “party autonomy” thus is quite misleading. That is,
whether in fact the parties have excluded application of the CISG
requires a corresponding agreement between them.82 Thus, where
a party’s standard business terms contain a clause seeking to exclude the CISG, a court must first determine whether that clause
became part of the parties’ contract and this, in turn, requires application of a set of legal rules for identifying a contractual
agreement.83 That set of legal rules is found in the contract formation provisions of the CISG itself.
Foreign courts have neatly described this idea as the “autonomous” application of the CISG’s contract formation rules.84 A recent
decision of the Austrian Supreme Court provides a good example.
The court there began by stating the basic principle that “an
agreement on and effectiveness of an exclusion of the application of
the CISG must be determined according to its contract formation
rules.”85 In addressing the effectiveness of a claimed exclusion
through a party’s standard business terms, the court then distilled
the essential point as follows:
If the CISG’s sphere of application rules apply and the CISG
contains a rule for a particular issue, it displaces national law....
To this extent the Convention takes priority and an exclusion of
it requires a substantive agreement between the parties, and
whether such an agreement has been reached is determined by
the autonomous contract formation rules of the Convention.86
81. FOLSOM ET AL., supra note 40, § 2.5, at 55.
82. See id.
83. See, e.g., Hanwha Corp. v. Cedar Petrochemicals, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 2d 426 (S.D.N.Y.
2011).
84. See Oberster Gerichtshof [OGH] [Supreme Court] June 29, 2017, 8 Ob 104/16a,
https://www.ris.bka.gv.at/Dokumente/Justiz/JJT_20170629_OGH0002_0080OB00104_16A
0000_000/JJT_20170629_OGH0002_0080OB00104_16A0000_000.pdf [https://perma.cc/TDQ58SVJ] (Austria); LG Aachen [Regional Court], June 22, 2010, 41 O 94/09, para. 53, https://
openjur.de/u/146146.html [https://perma.cc/RZ98-6Z3X] (Ger.) [translations by Author].
85. OGH, June 29, 2017 [translation by Author].
86. Id. [translation by Author]; see also Handelsgericht [Commercial Court] June 15, 2010,
HG.2009.164, http://ww2.gerichte.sg.ch/home/dienstleistungen/rechtsprechung/kantonsgeri
cht/entscheide_2010/hg_2009_164.html [https://perma.cc/Q9FC-3UE5] (Switz.) (holding that
the effectiveness of an attempted exclusion of the CISG through one party’s standard business
terms must be determined “by applying the UN Sales Convention”) [translation by Author].
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The CISG’s status as a “self-executing” treaty gives this approach
to an attempted exclusion through standard business terms a
special significance in the United States. The Southern District of
New York’s opinion in Hanwha Corp. v. Cedar Petrochemicals, Inc.
provides a good example.87 There, the standard business terms of a
New York-based seller and a South Korea-based buyer each included a clause designating its favored domestic law.88 Noting that
both the United States and South Korea have ratified the CISG, the
court first addressed the question of “whether the CISG, some other
law, or both, governs the question of contract formation.”89 The
answer, the court properly concluded, is found in the CISG itself:
In this case, the parties each attempted to opt out of the CISG,
but could not agree on the law to displace it, [the seller] preferring New York law and the UCC, and [the buyer] preferring
Singapore law.... Here, the parties never agreed to a substantive
law to displace the CISG, and their competing choices must fall
away, leaving the CISG to fill the void by its own self-executing
force.90

Numerous U.S. courts have embraced this analysis as well.91 The
short of the matter is that a one-sided attempt to exclude the CISG
through standard business terms avails a party nothing.92 To be
87. 760 F. Supp. 2d 426 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
88. Id. at 429.
89. Id. at 430.
90. Id. at 431.
91. See, e.g., Nucap Indus., Inc. v. Robert Bosch LLC, 273 F. Supp. 3d 986, 1006 (N.D.
Ill. 2017) (holding that the CISG’s contract formation rules governed a dispute over whether
one party’s attempt to exclude the Convention through standard business terms was effective
(citing VLM Food Trading Int’l, Inc. v. Ill. Trading Co., 748 F.3d 780, 787 (7th Cir. 2014)));
Turfworthy, LLC v. Dr. Karl Wetekam & Co., 26 F. Supp. 3d 496, 503 (M.D.N.C. 2014)
(observing that because the parties disputed which of their respective sets of standard
business terms governed their relationship, “the CISG is applicable in determining whether
these parties from applicable countries formed a contract that included one or both of these
documents” (first citing Belcher-Robinson, L.L.C. v. Linamar Corp., 699 F. Supp. 2d 1329,
1335 n.4 (M.D. Ala. 2010); and then citing Zhejiang Shaoxing Yongli Printing & Dyeing Co.,
Ltd. v. Microflock Textile Grp. Corp., No. 06-22608-CIV, 2008 WL 2098062, at *2 (S.D. Fla.
May 19, 2008))); see also Hanwha Corp., 760 F. Supp. 2d at 431; Belcher-Robinson, 699 Fl.
Supp. 2d at 1335 n.4 (citing Zhejiang Shaoxing Yongli Printing & Dyeing Co., 2008 WL
2098062, at *2).
92. See FOLSOM ET AL., supra note 40, § 2.5, at 55; Martin Schmidt-Kessel, Introduction
to Articles 14-24, in COMMENTARY ON THE UN CONVENTION FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF
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sure, the CISG permits the parties to an international sales transaction to exclude its application.93 But the autonomous, selfexecuting contract formation rules of the CISG itself will determine
whether a particular choice-of-law clause in fact is effective—and
standard business terms, however cleverly drafted, cannot avoid
that result.94
All of this heightens the importance of the CISG’s actual contract
formation regime and in particular its rules for resolving conflicts
between standard business terms. As noted in the Introduction,
however, the CISG’s approach to this issue is subject to considerable
controversy. Before turning to the details of that controversy, we
must first examine the Convention’s basic, structural rules of contract formation.
II. THE CONTROVERSY: DISSENSUS IN CONTRACT FORMATION
A. Setting the Foundation: The CISG’s Basic Formation Scheme
The basic principles of contract formation under the CISG are
well-known and in large measure neither surprising nor controversial.95 The structural elements are the familiar notions of “offer”
(defined in Article 14) and “acceptance” (defined in Article 18).96 An
effective offer is one that is “sufficiently definite”97 and “indicates
the intention of the offeror to be bound in case of acceptance,”98
provided it actually “reaches” the offeree.99
GOODS (CISG), supra note 40, at 223, 238 (observing that “the prevailing opinion among
commentators” is that a court must apply CISG Articles 14-24 to determine the effectiveness
of an exclusion of the CISG).
93. FOLSOM ET AL., supra note 40, § 2.5, at 55.
94. Id. § 2.1, at 45.
95. For recent reviews of these basic rules by U.S. courts, see VLM Food Trading Int’l, 811
F.3d at 251-52; Hanwha Corp., 760 F. Supp. 2d at 431-32.
96. CISG, supra note 1, arts. 14, 18. For recent applications in U.S. courts, see Nucap
Indus., 273 F. Supp. 3d at 1007; VLM Food Trading Int’l, 811 F.3d at 251.
97. CISG, supra note 1, art. 14(1). A proposal to conclude a contract satisfies this
requirement “if it indicates the goods and expressly or implicitly fixes or makes provision for
determining the quantity and the price.” Id.
98. Id.; see also Hanwha Corp., 760 F. Supp. 2d at 432 (holding that, although a buyer
made a “sufficiently definite” offer, it lacked an intent to be bound without an agreement on
certain issues raised in negotiations).
99. CISG, supra note 1, art. 15(1). Article 24 also provides more detail on when “an offer,
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Under CISG Article 18(1), an effective acceptance is a “statement
... or other conduct” by an offeree “indicating assent to an offer.”100
This reflects the unsurprising notion that an effective acceptance
must express “the offeree’s assent to the offer, [i.e.,] an intention to
be bound by it and its terms.”101 Such an acceptance then “becomes
effective” (thus forming a contract)102 when it “reaches the offeror.”103
So far so good. The problem is that in modern commerce contracting rarely occurs in such a stylized fashion. Instead of an offer and
a single, timely, and unconditional acceptance, most deals involve
rounds of negotiations with corresponding exchanges of contract
forms.104 To make any plausible claim of accommodating this
complexity, therefore, a legal system must address the common
situation of a “deviating acceptance,” that is, an acceptance that
does not agree on all points proposed in the offer.105
The drafters of the U.N. Sales Convention were well aware of this
issue, but—in the tense atmosphere of the Cold War in the 1970s—
chose to avoid it through a superficial compromise.106 As I have
explained elsewhere in detail,107 at the time traditionalists wanted
declaration of acceptance or any other indication of intention ‘reaches’” another party. Id. art.
24.
100. Id. art. 18(1); see also Orica Austl. Pty. Ltd. v. Aston Evaporative Servs., LLC, No.
14-cv-0412-WJM-CBS, 2015 WL 4538534, at *6 (D. Colo. July 28, 2015) (holding that factual
disputes over the subjective intent of an offeree in a reply email precluded summary judgment on the issue of contract formation).
101. Ulrich G. Schroeter, Article 18, in COMMENTARY ON THE UN CONVENTION ON THE
INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (CISG), supra note 40, at 333. The same provision makes
clear, however, that “[s]ilence or inactivity does not in itself amount to acceptance.” CISG,
supra note 1, art. 18(1).
102. CISG, supra note 1, art. 23 (“A contract is concluded at the moment when an
acceptance of an offer becomes effective.”).
103. Id. art. 18(2). This approach differs from the Anglo-American “mailbox rule.” See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 63, cmt. a (AM. L. INST. 1981). Under the CISG, the
acceptance must also reach the offeror within the time fixed in the offer or, failing that, within
a reasonable time. CISG, supra note 1, art. 18(2). This arrival requirement does not apply,
however, if, as a result of an agreement or an established practice between the parties, “the
offeree may indicate assent by performing an act” (such as a seller sending ordered goods or
a buyer setting up a requested letter of credit for payment). Id. art. 18(3). For a detailed
analysis of these rules, see FOLSOM ET AL., supra note 40, § 2.16, at 90-92.
104. See Van Alstine, supra note 15, at 1-2.
105. See id. at 21.
106. See id.
107. See id. at 21-27, 82-83.
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to leave the problem solely with a simple statement of the traditional “mirror image rule.”108 Reformers in contrast desired a
sophisticated, and ultimately more flexible, solution.109 The result
was a rule, set forth in CISG Article 19, that seems to endorse both
approaches, but ultimately offers no solution at all.110
Article 19(1) begins with traditional notions: a reply to an offer
that “purports to be an acceptance” in fact does not operate as one
if it “contains additions, limitations or other modifications” as
compared to the offer.111 Instead, the reply “is a rejection of the offer
and constitutes a counter-offer,”112 which also effects a termination
of the original offer.113 This result obtains even if the reply is styled
as an acceptance and even if the offeree actually intended it to be
one.114 Taken as a whole, CISG Article 19(1) reflects the age-old
“mirror image rule” originally adopted in most legal systems.115
The reformers nonetheless (weakly) asserted themselves in the
form of the second paragraph of Article 19. Under that provision,
the rigid result of Article 19(1) does not apply if the additional or
different terms in the reply “do not materially alter the terms of the
offer.”116 In such a case, the reply operates as an acceptance (and
thus forms a contract), unless the offeror timely objects.117
108. Id. at 23-24.
109. See id.
110. Id. at 25.
111. CISG, supra note 1, art. 19(1).
112. Id.
113. Id. art. 17.
114. Id. art. 19(1) (stating that the rule applies even if the reply “purports to be an acceptance”).
115. See Ulrich G. Schroeter, Article 19, in COMMENTARY ON THE UN CONVENTION ON THE
INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (CISG), supra note 40, at 350, 351. Regarding domestic law,
see, for example, CODE CIVIL [C. CIV.] [CIVIL CODE] art. 1118(3) (Fr.), translation at http://
www.textes.justice.gouv.fr/art_pix/THE-LAW-OF-CONTRACT-2-5-16.pdf [https://perma.cc/
84T4-CFC2] (“An acceptance which does not conform to the offer has no effect, apart from
constituting a new offer.”); BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL CODE], § 150, para. 2,
https://www.gesetze-im-internet.de/bgb/_150.html [https://perma.cc/T5VK-SA3V] (Ger.) (“An
acceptance subject to additions, limitations or other deviations operates as a rejection coupled
with a new offer.”) [translation by Author]; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 59 (AM.
L. INST. 1981) (“A reply to an offer which purports to accept it but is conditional on the
offeror’s assent to terms additional to or different from those offered is not an acceptance but
is a counter-offer.”).
116. CISG, supra note 1, art. 19(2).
117. Id. (stating that in such a case the reply “constitutes an acceptance, unless the offeror,
without undue delay, objects orally to the discrepancy or dispatches a notice to that effect”).
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The drafters’ timid compromise then is revealed in Article 19(3),
for that provision dissolves the flexibility promised in Article 19(2).
This is because Article 19(3) broadly defines “material” to mean not
only the expected subjects of price and payment, but also all terms
“relating ... to the ... quality and quantity of the goods, place and
time of delivery, extent of one party’s liability to the other or the
settlement of disputes.”118 Even this list is not exhaustive, for the
stated terms are only “among other things” that may be “considered
to alter the terms of the offer materially.”119
Distilled to its practical essence, Article 19(3) renders Article
19(2) irrelevant. As I have described the point elsewhere, “[w]hat
the second paragraph giveth ... the third paragraph taketh away.”120
With only a moment’s thought, it becomes clear that Article 19(3)
includes within the concept of “material” effectively every term that
parties could care about in modern commerce.121 Examples of a term
that is not material as contemplated by Article 19 are exceptionally
rare.122 Therefore, in the absence of a deal carefully negotiated in
advance, any reply by an offeree other than an unconditional
surrender will result in a rejection of the original offer and a
counteroffer.123
Well, what next? That is, what rule obtains if the parties proceed
to perform the deal, and thus ultimately manifest a contractual
In absence of such an objection, the contract so formed includes the terms in the offer as well
as the nonmaterial modifications in the acceptance. Id.
118. Id. art. 19(3).
119. Id.; see also Schroeter, supra note 115, at 358-59 (stating that the list of material
terms in Article 19(3) is “clearly non-exhaustive”).
120. Van Alstine, supra note 15, at 22.
121. JOHN O. HONNOLD, UNIFORM LAW FOR INTERNATIONAL SALES UNDER THE 1980 UNITED
NATIONS CONVENTION 245 (Harry M. Flechtner ed., 4th ed. 2009) (“Under paragraph (3) the
modifications that are considered ... ‘material’ cover most of the aspects of the contract.”); Van
Alstine, supra note 15, at 25-26 (observing that the list in Article 19(3) “embrace[s] ...
effectively all subjects that would be of significance in the typical sales transaction”).
122. See, e.g., Oberlandesgericht Koblenz [OLG] [Appellate Court], Mar. 1, 2010, 2 U 816/09
(Ger.), translation at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/100301g1.html [https://perma.cc/ YY55NB8W] (regarding a minor change to a technical specification); Oberlandesgericht Koblenz
[OLG] [Appellate Court], Oct. 4, 2002, 8 U 1909/01 (Ger.), translation at http://cisgw3.law.
pace.edu/cases/021004g1.html [https://perma.cc/9BP6-FGFD] (regarding a change to which
party would bear the cost of transportation).
123. See Franco Ferrari, Article 19, in UN CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (CISG), supra note 44, at 279, 287-88; Schroeter, supra note 115,
at 363-64.
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agreement, even though their prior, formal declarations did not? I
have referred to this common situation as a “partial dissensus” to
capture the idea of an agreement on the essential aspects of a sales
contract, but a continuing lack of agreement on other issues.124 The
short answer to this fundamental question is that we do not know.
As noted, the drafters simply could not find a consensus answer and
chose to avoid the issue so as not to scuttle the entire project.125
What they left, however, were the seeds of the controversy that has
raged among courts and scholars for over three decades.
Part IV will explain in detail the proper resolution to this
controversy. Nonetheless, we may clear away two matters now. The
first is that, although the Convention does not provide a clear
answer, the resolution of the problem of a “partial dissensus” must
be found in the Convention itself. In formal terms, this is a
“[q]uestion[ ] concerning matters governed by this Convention” as
declared in CISG Article 7(2).126 Thus, domestic law is irrelevant
here.127 The debate over the settlement of the battle of the forms
under the CISG instead must take place exclusively within the
arena of the CISG, including with reference to the “general principles on which it is based.”128 The second point is that, whatever the
proper solution, the CISG’s approach to the battle of the forms, as
U.S. courts have correctly recognized, bears no resemblance to that
adopted in the domestic UCC.129
124. See Van Alstine, supra note 15, at 3.
125. For a brief review of the drafting history on this decision, see Michael P. Van Alstine,
Dynamic Treaty Interpretation, 146 U. PA. L. REV. 687, 771 n.348 (1998).
126. CISG, supra note 1, art. 7(2).
127. See FOLSOM ET AL., supra note 40, § 2.17, at 94; Ferrari, supra note 123, at 287-89;
Schroeter, supra note 115, at 364-65. One commentator has asserted that a “uniform” solution
is to apply the UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS for
contracts governed by the CISG. See Andrea Fejös, Battle of Forms Under the Convention on
Contracts for the International Sale of Goods (CISG): A Uniform Solution?, 11 VINDOBONA J.
INT’L COM. L. & ARB. 113, 124 (2007). Because there is no gap in the CISG, this is clearly not
an appropriate solution.
128. CISG, supra note 1, art. 7(2) (“Questions concerning matters governed by this
Convention which are not expressly settled in it are to be settled in conformity with the
general principles on which it is based.”). For a comprehensive examination of the implications of this directive, see Van Alstine, supra note 125, at 731-91.
129. See VLM Food Trading Int’l, Inc. v. Ill. Trading Co., 748 F.3d 780, 786 (7th Cir. 2014)
(“[T]he Convention’s battle-of-the-forms provision, Article 19, is significantly different from
§ 2-207.”); Roser Techs., Inc. v. Carl Schreiber GmbH, No. 11cv302 ERIE, 2013 WL 4852314,
at *5 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 10, 2013) (“[N]o provision of the [CISG] creates such diametrical
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B. The Law Confronts Lawyering: Contracting in the Shadow of
Standard Business Terms
Before we turn to the specifics of the controversy over a “partial
dissensus,” our understanding of the problem will benefit from a
brief reminder of why it is so common and so difficult to resolve. The
proper place to begin is with a reminder that in commercial transactions the formal rules of law function only in the background.
Ultimately, they serve as a set of “off-the-rack” default rules for the
making of deals.130 But the actual agreement of the parties takes
priority, for (as we have seen) CISG Article 6 expressly empowers
the parties to “derogate from or vary ... any of its provisions.”131
The parties of course may express such an agreement through a
formal, final contract document. The challenge is that in the hustle
of modern transactions, they have neither the time nor inclination
to negotiate over every aspect of their deal, and they cannot contemplate every issue that may arise in the future.132 This is all the
more difficult for international deals, where distance, culture,
language, and even time zones make formal negotiations impractical for all but the largest transactions.133
It is tempting to believe that a combination of lawyers and
computers can provide a solution. First, effectively every enterprise,
large and small, engages clever lawyers to prepare a set of contract
opposition to the [UCC] rule as does Article 19.” (quoting 1 RONALD A. BRAND, FUNDAMENTALS OF INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS 75 (2013)) (alterations in original));
Mia. Valley Paper, LLC v. Lebbing Eng’g & Consulting GmbH, No. 1:05-CV-00702, 2009
WL 818618, at *4 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 26, 2009) (“There are several critical differences between
the law governing contract formation under the CISG and the more familiar principles of
the Uniform Commercial Code.”).
130. See Ian Ayres & Robert Gertner, Filling Gaps in Incomplete Contracts: An Economic
Theory of Default Rules, 99 YALE L.J. 87, 87, 91 (1989) (describing default rules as “off-therack” rules that “fill the gaps in incomplete contracts” and “govern unless the parties contract
around them”); Erik Encarnacion, Contract as Commodified Promise, 71 VAND. L. REV. 61, 68
(2018) (“Because contracts cannot account for every possible contingency, contract law
supplies a wide variety of ... default contractual terms that apply absent express agreement
to the contrary.”).
131. CISG, supra note 1, art. 6; see supra notes 66-72 and accompanying text. As CISG
Article 9 declares, the parties’ agreement extends beyond the express terms of their contract
to include “any usage to which they have agreed and ... any practices which they have
established between themselves.” CISG, supra note 1, art. 9(1).
132. See Van Alstine, supra note 15, at 2-3.
133. See FOLSOM ET AL., supra note 40, § 1.1, at 2-3.
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terms ready-made for all future transactions.134 With such a
mandate, the lawyers address every conceivable issue and circumstance through a provision that favors their client’s interests in full.
Management then instructs all responsible parties in the enterprise
to insist on these standard business terms in all future transactions.
But of course the counterparty will have pursued the same policy
and thus devised its own package of one-sided standard contract
terms. Moreover, sellers will have instructed their lawyers to craft
contract terms that (of course) favor the interests of sellers, and
buyers will have terms that favor those of buyers.
This subject has bedeviled lawmakers since the advent of modern
means of reproduction of text and modern forms of communication.
In the United States, the drafters of section 2-207 of the Uniform
Commercial Code sought to introduce a flexible approach tailored
more closely to business realities.135 The confused result, however,
was only a “statutory disaster”136 with “ramifications ... so broad as
to be called the nuclear accident of Article 2.”137
As noted, the drafters of the CISG likewise were aware of this
modern challenge to the traditional rules of contract law but simply
could not agree on a solution.138 As the official Digest of Case Law on
the CISG thus observes, “[t]he Convention does not have special
rules to address the issues raised when a potential seller and buyer
both use standard contract terms prepared in advance for general
and repeated use (the so-called ‘battle of the forms’).”139
In fact, the empty compromise in Article 19 has made matters
worse—for it frustrates contract formation, but provides no guidance on what happens next. The reason lies in the interaction of
CISG Article 19 and lawyer-drafted, one-sided standard business
terms. Recall that any reply to an offer that contains a material
alteration operates as a rejection, and that Article 19(3) defines as
134. For an examination of these practices, see E. Allan Farnsworth, Review of Standard
Forms or Terms Under the Vienna Convention, 21 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 439, 447 (1988);
Steensgaard, supra note 14, at 4-5; Van Alstine, supra note 15, at 28-33.
135. Douglas G. Baird & Robert Weisberg, Rules, Standards, and the Battle of the Forms:
A Reassessment of § 2-207, 68 VA. L. REV. 1217, 1221-22 (1982).
136. Id. at 1224.
137. John E. Murray, Jr., A Proposed Revision of Section 2-207 of the Uniform Commercial
Code, 6 J.L. & COM. 337, 344 (1986).
138. See supra notes 105-10 and accompanying text.
139. UNCITRAL DIGEST, supra note 8, art. 19, para. 6, at 98-99.

2020]

THE UNIFIED FIELD SOLUTION

239

material effectively all subjects of interest in international sales
transactions.140 Most often, this comes in the form of a seller’s “order
acknowledgement” form sent in response to a buyer’s original
“purchase order” form.141 The rub is that even lawyers of modest
competence will have drafted their client’s standard terms to include many, often all, and in any event at least one, of the matters
identified in Article 19(3).142 Thus, if the offeree includes its standard business terms in a reply, in the great run of cases under the
CISG this will not conclude a contract.143
Nonetheless, businesspeople care about, well, the business
aspects of their deal (price, specifications for and quantity of the
goods, performance time). In actual dealmaking, therefore, the
parties’ carefully crafted standard business terms play a considerably less important role than intended by the lawyers.144 One or
both of the involved purchasing and sales managers may dutifully
send the terms with the offer and acceptance documents, but they
do not view any technical differences as an impediment to concluding a contract.145 The parties thus proceed to perform the
transaction—the seller ships the goods and the buyer makes
payment—and it is only if a dispute later arises that they will pull
out and actually read their respective standard “contract” terms.146
Once the parties have proceeded to perform the deal, it is clear
that they have concluded a contract under the principle of party
autonomy in CISG Article 6.147 The significant, unresolved issue is
the legal process by which that contract came into being. Regarding
the essential terms of a sales contract, the parties’ performance
clearly manifests mutual assent (because the seller has shipped
See supra notes 120-23 and accompanying text.
See FOLSOM ET AL., supra note 40, § 2.17, at 92-93; HONNOLD, supra note 121, at 241.
FOLSOM ET AL., supra note 40, § 2.17, at 92-93.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 93; see also HONNOLD, supra note 121, at 250; CISG ADVISORY COUNCIL,
OPINION NO. 13: INCLUSION OF STANDARD TERMS UNDER THE CISG 3 (2013), https://www.cis
gac.com/file/repository/CISG_Advisory_Council_Opinion_No_13.pdf [https://perma.cc/7P UAT7NG] (declaring that when the parties perform the deal, “a contract is concluded on the basis
of the negotiated terms and of any standard terms which are common in substance” absent
objection by either party).
140.
141.
142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.
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specific goods and the buyer has paid a specific price).148 The unresolved issue is what other terms, especially standard business
terms, also become part of the contract.149
This is the point at which the traditional “camps” on the battle of
the forms under the CISG diverge. As a foundation for the analysis
to follow, the next Subsection examines the reasoning underlying
each of those two proposed solutions to this most enduring controversy under the U.N. Sales Convention.
C. The Opposing “Camps” in the Battle of the Forms
It has become an established convention to divide the views on
the battle of the forms (a partial dissensus) into two “opposing”
camps: “last shot” and “knock out.”150 The former is satisfied with
the simple structural elements of CISG Articles 18 and 19; the
latter prefers a deeper examination of values elsewhere in the
Convention.151 The literature on the subject is vast. Indeed, one can
hardly capture the relevant citations in a reasonable footnote.152 In

148. This agreement on the goods and the price will satisfy the “definiteness” requirements
of CISG Article 14. See CISG, supra note 1, art. 14(1) (“A proposal for concluding a contract
... is sufficiently definite if it indicates the goods and expressly or implicitly fixes or makes
provision for determining the quantity and the price.”).
149. FOLSOM ET AL., supra note 40, § 2.17, at 93.
150. See, e.g., Ferrari, supra note 123, at 289-90; Ulrich Magnus, Last Shot vs. Knock Out—
Still Battle over the Battle of Forms Under the CISG, in COMMERCIAL LAW CHALLENGES IN
THE 21ST CENTURY; JAN HELLNER IN MEMORIAM 185 (Ross Cranston et al. eds., 2007);
Schroeter, supra note 115, at 365-67.
151. See FOLSOM ET AL., supra note 40, § 2.17, at 93-94.
152. For an introduction to the vast literature on the knock out approach, see Ferrari,
supra note 123, at 289 & n.79; Schroeter, supra note 101, at 366 & n.139; see also HONNOLD,
supra note 121, at 252-53; Van Alstine, supra note 15, at 92. For an introduction to scholarly
commentary supportive of the last shot approach, see Ferrari, supra note 123, at 290 & n.82;
Schroeter, supra note 101, at 365 & n.136; Van Alstine, supra note 15, at 67-68; see also E.
Allan Farnsworth, Article 19, in COMMENTARY ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALES LAW: THE 1980
VIENNA SALES CONVENTION 175, 179 (C. Massimo Bianca & Michael J. Bonell eds., 1987); J.
Clark Kelso, Note, The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of
Goods: Contract Formation and the Battle of Forms, 21 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 529, 554
(1983); Rob Schultz, Note, Rolling Contract Formation Under the UN Convention on Contracts
for the International Sale of Goods, 35 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 263, 282 (2002); Charles Sukurs,
Note, Harmonizing the Battle of the Forms: A Comparison of the United States, Canada, and
the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, 34 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT’L L. 1481, 1499 (2001).
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this Part, I explain the foundations of the two views; a more detailed, critical analysis will follow in Part IV.
1. The Last Shot Approach
There is a simplistic, almost self-evident quality to the so-called
last shot approach for the battle of the forms under the CISG. Its
premise is that the express provisions of the CISG already resolve
the issue.153 There is, in other words, no need for interpretation of
the CISG on this score because the solution is embedded in the
structure of CISG Articles 19, 18, and 17.154
The argument has only two simple steps. First, supporters
correctly observe that Article 19 provides a clear rule where a reply
contains terms that differ from those of the offer: if those terms are
“material,” the reply operates not as an acceptance, but instead as
a rejection and a counteroffer.155 A further effect is that the original
offer is “terminated,” and thus is no longer available for acceptance.156 If the expansive definition of “material” in Article 19(3)
means that this result obtains for the great bulk of replies in
international sales transactions, so be it.
If, then, the parties perform the contemplated deal, the final step
in the analysis is the self-evident one: with the original offer
terminated, the only remaining foundation for forming a contract is
the counteroffer constructed for the parties under CISG Article
19(1).157 All that then remains is the implied acceptance rule in
Article 18(1): the performance of the contract by the new counterofferee (the original offeror) reflects “conduct ... indicating assent to”
the counteroffer.158 In the final analysis, this approach gives total
153. FOLSOM ET AL., supra note 40, § 2.17, at 94.
154. See id.
155. See, e.g., Farnsworth, supra note 152, at 179; Ferrari, supra note 123, at 289; see also
supra notes 111-23 and accompanying text.
156. CISG, supra note 1, art. 17.
157. See id. art. 19(1).
158. See id. art. 18(1); see also Ferrari, supra note 123, at 289-90 (asserting that if the
parties proceed to perform following conflicts in their standard business terms, “one must
assume that the (original) offeror has accepted” the standard business terms last proposed by
the offeree); Burghard Piltz, Standard Terms in UN-Contracts of Sale, 8 VINDOBONA J. INT’L
COM. L. & ARB. 233, 242 (2004) (“[T]here is no reason to depart from the last-shot-rule of
Art. 19, para. 1 CISG if the later conduct of one party ... shows its consent with the offer of the
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victory to the party who happens to send the last form prior to
performance. The “last shot” truly wins.
This approach to the battle of the forms under the CISG has
found some support in the scholarly literature.159 Most supporters
see it as a self-evident extension of the mirror image rule.160 Others
claim that the approach advances interests of certainty.161 One has
simply surrendered and declared that “agreement on a uniform lastshot rule is preferable to the current confusion.”162
A few courts in the United States also seem to have accepted the
last shot rule for the Convention, although with little formal
analysis. Three have stated the point explicitly,163 and it may be
implied from the discussion of a few others.164 Some foreign courts
other party to apply its standard terms.”); Kevin C. Stemp, A Comparative Analysis of the
“Battle of the Forms,” 15 TRANSNAT’L L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 243, 261 (2005).
159. See Farnsworth, supra note 152, at 179; Ferrari, supra note 123, at 289-90; Henry D.
Gabriel, The Battle of the Forms: A Comparison of the United Nations Convention for the
International Sale of Goods and the Uniform Commercial Code: The Common Law and the
Uniform Commercial Code, 49 BUS. LAW. 1053, 1057-58 (1994); Piltz, supra note 158, at 242;
Giesela Rühl, The Battle of the Forms: Comparative and Economic Observations, 24 U. PA. J.
INT’L ECON. L. 189, 196-98 (2003); Stemp, supra note 158, at 261.
160. See Gabriel, supra note 159, at 1053 (asserting that the last shot rule “is the logical
result of the ‘mirror image rule’”); see also Ferrari, supra note 123, at 289-90; Burte A. Leete,
Contract Formation Under the United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International
Sale of Goods and the Uniform Commercial Code: Pitfalls for the Unwary, 6 TEMP. INT’L &
COMP. L.J. 193, 214 (1992) (“With regard to the battle of forms issue, it seems clear that the
party sending the last form will be the one whose terms prevail.”); Piltz, supra note 158, at
240-42.
161. See Sarah Howard Jenkins, Contract Resurrected! Contract Formation: Common Law
~ UCC ~ CISG, 40 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 245, 290 (2014) (claiming that “the
conservative ‘last shot rule’ of the CISG provides greater certainty for determining the terms
of the contract than” the malleable approach of the UCC); Maria del Pilar Perales Viscasillas,
“Battle of the Forms” Under the 1980 United Nations Convention on Contracts for the
International Sale of Goods: A Comparison with Section 2-207 UCC and the UNIDROIT
Principles, 10 PACE U. SCH. L. INT’L L. REV. 97, 148 (1998) (“[T]he mirror image and last-shot
rule provide a certainty and legal security for the parties.”).
162. See Steensgaard, supra note 14, at 35.
163. VLM Food Trading Int’l, Inc. v. Ill. Trading Co., 811 F.3d 247, 251 (7th Cir. 2016)
(“[U]nder the [Convention] ... [t]he terms of the contract are those embodied in the last offer
(or counteroffer) made prior to a contract being formed.” (second alteration in original)
(quoting Roser Techs., Inc. v. Carl Schreiber GmbH, No. 11cv302 ERIE, 2013 WL 4852314,
at *5 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 10, 2013))); Arsape S.A. v. JDS Uniphase Corp., No. C 03-04535 JW,
2006 WL 8442164, at *4 (N.D. Cal. June 15, 2006) (“[T]he CISG provides for a ‘last-shot’
rule.”).
164. See Norfolk S. Ry. Co. v. Power Source Supply, Inc., No. 06-58 J, 2008 WL 2884102,
at *6-7 (W.D. Pa. July 25, 2008) (giving effect to the last form exchanged between the parties

2020]

THE UNIFIED FIELD SOLUTION

243

have indicated support for this approach as well, although driven by
the particular facts at issue.165
2. The Knock Out Approach
The second leading theory for resolving the battle of the forms has
come to be known as the “knock out rule.”166 This approach is not
satisfied with a mechanical application of the Convention’s structural provisions; instead, it seeks a solution in two deeper, interrelated values at the foundation of its contract formation scheme.
The first is the principle of party autonomy. Recall that CISG
Article 6 empowers the parties to “derogate from or vary the effect
of any of [the Convention’s] provisions.”167 The distilled essence of
this principle is that the parties’ agreement takes priority over the
express provisions of the CISG, and even its contract formation
rules in Articles 14, 18, and 19.168
The knock out approach proceeds on the premise that the parties
may form a contract without regard to the lock-step “offer-acceptance scheme.”169 To be sure, as we have seen, the mirror image rule
of CISG Article 19(1) means that, in the great run of cases, a reply
to an offer will operate as a rejection and counteroffer.170 Nonetheless, if the parties proceed to perform the contemplated transaction,
their conduct will reflect an agreement on the essential terms
necessary to form a sales contract.171
The knock out approach then turns to the second core value of
contract formation under the CISG, its rules for determining party
intent. CISG Article 8 provides these rules, and I will have much
before performance). Golden Valley Grape Juice & Wine, LLC v. Centrisys Corp., No. CV F 091424 LJO GSA, 2010 WL 347897 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 2010), seems to support the same view,
but it only involved an offer that a buyer accepted without objection, id. at *4-5.
165. See Oberlandesgericht [OLG] [Appellate Court] Mar. 23, 2005, 6 R 200/04f (Austria),
translation at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/050323a3.html [https://perma.cc/2PYP-T32A];
Oberlandesgericht Koblenz [OLG] [Appellate Court], Oct. 4, 2002, 8 U 1909/01 (Ger.), translation at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/021004g1.html [https://perma.cc/4QGZ-EUMT].
166. See Magnus, supra note 150, at 192; Schroeter, supra note 115, at 366.
167. CISG, supra note 1, art. 6; see also supra notes 70-72 and accompanying text.
168. See FOLSOM ET AL., supra note 40, § 2.17, at 95; Schmidt-Kessel, supra note 92, at 247.
169. See FOLSOM ET AL., supra note 40, § 2.17, at 95; HONNOLD, supra note 121, at 250;
Schroeter, supra note 115, at 368-69; Van Alstine, supra note 15, at 83-84.
170. See supra notes 120-23 and accompanying text.
171. See supra notes 147-48 and accompanying text.
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more to say about them below.172 For now, it will suffice to observe
that a party’s actual intent will prevail where the other party at
least “could not have been unaware” of that intent.173 And in a blunt
rejection of Anglo-American notions, Article 8(3) obligates a court to
consider in this inquiry “all relevant circumstances of the case.”174
As a result, the analysis of whether and to what extent a party has
agreed to standard business terms proposed by the other must begin
with an examination of the party’s actual intent under the circumstances.
At this point the knock out approach fundamentally diverges from
the last shot view. Without more, supporters assert, the simple fact
of performance does not reflect the unqualified assent of the original offeror to the entirety of the counteroffer constructed by Article
19(1).175 Instead, where the parties have not otherwise clarified the
content of their deal, the contract consists only of the matters on
which their respective standard business terms are in substantive
agreement.176 All other proposed terms do not become part of the
contract.177 The background rules of the Convention then fill the
gaps in the parties’ deal.178
The German Federal Court of Justice (Bundesgerichtshof) has
been the foremost proponent of the knock out rule under the
CISG.179 Indeed, its opinion in the so-called Powdered Milk Case has
become the model for later courts in Germany and elsewhere.180 In
that case, a Germany-based seller offered to sell milk products
“exclusively” on the basis of its standard business terms; the
Netherlands-based buyer declared its acceptance, but in the process
also insisted on the application of its standard business terms.181 As
172. See infra Part III.B.
173. CISG, supra note 1, art. 8(1).
174. Id. art. 8(3). For more on this essential point, see infra Part III.B.1.c.
175. See, e.g., FOLSOM ET AL., supra note 40, § 2.17, at 95; Schroeter, supra note 115, at
368-69.
176. FOLSOM ET AL., supra note 40, § 2.17, at 95; Schroeter, supra note 115, at 371-72.
177. See Schroeter, supra note 115, at 371-72.
178. Id.; Van Alstine, supra note 15, at 91.
179. See FOLSOM ET AL., supra note 40, § 2.17, at 97.
180. See id. at 95-98.
181. See Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice], Jan. 9, 2002, VIII ZR 304/00
(Ger.), translation at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/020109g1.html [https://perma.cc/THU2N8YC].
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is common, neither party paid attention to the conflict, and both
performed the contemplated transaction.182 When a dispute arose
over the quality of the powdered milk, the seller nonetheless sought
to rely on limitation of liability provisions in its standard business
terms and in the standard business terms of the buyer.183
The court first agreed that the parties formed a contract notwithstanding the clear conflict between their contract declarations.184 In
specific, the court held—in conformance with the principle of party
autonomy in CISG Article 6—that the parties’ conduct manifested
mutual assent to a contract notwithstanding the formal rules in
CISG Article 19:
The appellate court correctly concluded that the partial conflicts
between the respective standard business terms of the plaintiff
and defendant did not lead to a failure of contract formation in
the sense of Art. 19, para. 1 and para. 3 CISG due to an absence
of mutual assent (dissensus). Its factual conclusion that, through
the performance of the contract, the parties made clear that they
did not view the absence of agreement between their respective
standard business terms as material in the sense of Art. 19
CISG is legally correct.185

The more important aspect of the opinion, however, addressed the
content of the resulting contract. Where both parties refer to standard business terms without a clear agreement on their effect, the
court reasoned, all such terms are excluded from the contract except
to the extent that they are in substantive agreement.186 “According
to what is most likely the prevailing view,” it declared, “standard
business terms that partially differ from each other become part of
the contract (only) to the extent that they do not conflict; otherwise,
the default legal rules apply.”187

182.
183.
184.
185.
186.
187.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. [translation by Author].
Id.
Id. [translation by Author].
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Other foreign courts have adopted this reasoning as well.188 It also
finds support in a majority of legal commentators,189 as well as from
the CISG Advisory Council.190
On the surface, it would appear that the last shot and knock out
approaches stand in an insoluble conflict. Careful examination
reveals otherwise. I explain this point in detail in Part IV below.
But before doing so, the next Part examines the impressive work of
U.S. courts on the related subjects of interpretation and the
requirements for an effective reference to standard business terms
in the contracting process.
III. THE UNNOTICED FOUNDATIONS FOR A NUANCED APPROACH
As noted above, a nascent trend in U.S. courts assumes, without
analysis, that the CISG adopts the rigid last shot approach to the
battle of the forms.191 This is the traditional approach of the common
188. See, e.g., Cour de cassation [Cass.] [Supreme Court] 1e civ., July 16, 1998, J 96-11.984
(Fr.), translation at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/980716f1.html [https://perma.cc/YAX7L5X5] (refusing to enforce conflicting forum selection clauses in the parties’ respective
standard business terms); Oberlandesgericht Köln [OLGK] [Higher Regional Court of
Cologne], May 24, 2006, 16 W 25/06 (Ger.), https://www.justiz.nrw.de/nrwe/olgs/koeln/j2006/
16_W__25_06beschluss20060524.html [https://perma.cc/Q8WX-MJH8] (declaring in a case
governed by the CISG that “in the case of conflicting terms the contract is to be interpreted
to the effect that there is at least an agreement on the overlapping terms”) [translation by
Author]; Oberlandesgericht Düsseldorf [OLG] [Provincial Appellate Court], July 25, 2003, 17
U 22/03 (Ger.), translation at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/030725g1.html [https://perma.
cc/LV6C-K4ES] (“According to the prevailing view ... the respective standard business terms
of the parties only become part of the contract to the extent that they do not conflict.”)
[translation by Author]; Rb. Overijssel 3 December 2014, C-07-198594-HZ ZA 12-139 (Neth.),
http://www.cisg-online.ch/content/api/cisg/urteile/2568.pdf [https://perma.cc/9HWX-BKYY]
(expressly adopting the knock out rule).
189. See, e.g., JÖRG SCHULTHEIß, ALLGEMEINE GESCHÄFTSBEDINGUNGEN IM UNKAUFRECHT: EINE VERGLEICHENDE ANALYSE DES EINHEITSRECHTS MIT DEM RECHT
DEUTSCHLANDS, ÖSTERREICHS, DER SCHWEIZ, FRANKREICHS UND DER USA 173-77 (2004);
Stefan Kröll & Rudolf Hennecke, Kollidierende Allgemeine Geschäftsbedingungen in
internationalen Kaufverträgen, 47 RECHT DER INTERNATIONALEN WIRTSCHAFT 736, 742-43
(2001); Schroeter, supra note 115, at 367-72; Van Alstine, supra note 15, at 81-92.
190. See CISG ADVISORY COUNCIL, supra note 147, at 3 (“Where both parties seek to
incorporate standard terms and reach agreement except on those terms, a contract is concluded on the basis of the negotiated terms and of any standard terms which are common in
substance.”). The CISG Advisory Council is a private body of legal scholars that periodically
offers formal opinions on the CISG. See Welcome to the CISG Advisory Council (CISG-AC),
CISG ADVISORY COUNCIL, https://www.cisgac.com/ [https://perma.cc/TCS6-ARFK].
191. See supra notes 167-68 and accompanying text.
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law and thus holds an allure for those who prefer simple, traditional
solutions. On a separate track, however, numerous U.S. courts have
seen that the CISG embraces flexible norms for the interpretation
of party intent and that this has direct implications for the incorporation of standard business terms.
Although thus far unnoticed, these related developments lay the
groundwork for a more sophisticated, nuanced approach to the
enduring controversy over the battle of the forms under the CISG.
To set the foundation, Section A first explains that in their modern
jurisprudence U.S. courts quite properly have followed the lead of
foreign courts in developing uniform solutions for international
treaty obligations reflected in the U.N. Sales Convention.
A. Acknowledging the Gravitational Pull of Uniformity
The U.N. Sales Convention, as we have noted, holds a special
place in the U.S. legal system, for it is an international treaty
ratified by the United States under Article II of the Constitution.192
As a general proposition, the Supreme Court has long emphasized
that in the interpretation of a treaty the opinions of other member
states’ courts are entitled to “considerable weight.”193
The CISG nonetheless affirms the point explicitly: Article 7(1)
declares that in the interpretation of the Convention’s provisions,
courts must have regard for “its international character” as well as
“the need to promote uniformity in its application.”194 As I have
explained in detail elsewhere, respect for the Convention’s “international character” requires “an ‘autonomous’ interpretation” of its
provisions, one that is “free from the influence of national legal
concepts and terminology.”195 The second point is equally important.
The direction “to promote uniformity” in application reflects a
mandate that domestic courts give deference to interpretive
decisions by courts of other Convention member states.196 This,
192. See supra Part I.A.
193. Abbott v. Abbott, 560 U.S. 1, 16 (2010) (quoting El Al Isr. Airlines, Ltd. v. Tsui Yuan
Tseng, 525 U.S. 155, 176 (1999)); Air Fr. v. Saks, 470 U.S. 392, 404 (1985) (quoting Benjamins
v. Brit. Eur. Airways, 572 F.2d 913, 919 (2d Cir. 1978)).
194. CISG, supra note 1, art. 7(1).
195. See Van Alstine, supra note 125, at 731-32.
196. See id. at 787-91 (examining this point in greater detail).
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then, is bolstered by a further instruction in the same provision that
courts advance “good faith in international trade,”197 which is a
refined reflection of the core principle of international law that
states must fulfill their treaty commitments in good faith.198
In the United States, the Convention’s status as directly applicable, supreme federal law makes these interpretive directives binding
on our courts as well.199 Taken together, they compel the courts,
first, to approach the Convention as a distinct, entirely separate
body of international law.200 This includes a basic recognition that
the Convention’s approaches even to familiar issues may diverge in
fundamental respects from traditional views in the United States.
As thorny interpretive issues arise, the directives also oblige
domestic courts to give due deference to prior opinions by courts of
other member states.201 Properly understood, this carries the direct
implication that as a consensus view emerges on a particular issue,
the interests of uniformity should exert a strong gravitational pull
on courts in the United States.
For over thirty years now, it has been the responsibility of U.S.
courts to apply the CISG in cases and controversies properly before
them. Easily their most impressive work in fulfilling this responsibility has been on two subjects of fundamental significance for our
purposes here. First, as Section B explains, they have recognized
that the CISG’s rules for interpreting party intent differ markedly
from the standard approaches under U.S. domestic law.202 Second,
as Section C describes, they have given deference to the emerging
consensus in foreign courts on the special treatment of standard
business terms in the contract formation process.203

197. CISG, supra note 1, art. 7(1).
198. See Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, supra note 25, art. 26 (“Every treaty
in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be performed by them in good faith.”).
199. See supra Part I.A.
200. See CISG, supra note 1, art. 7.
201. See id. The Convention also embraces a distinctly European, “dynamic” approach to
issues of gap-filling: under CISG Article 7(2), issues left unresolved by the express provisions
of the Convention “are to be settled in conformity with the general principles on which it is
based.” Id. art. 7(2). For a detailed examination of the significance of this approach, see Van
Alstine, supra note 125, at 738-91.
202. See infra Part III.B.
203. See infra Part III.C.
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B. The Fundamentally Different Approach to Determining Party
Intent
Because private parties may become bound to contractual obligations only through their consent, any reasonably sophisticated
body of contract law requires rules for interpreting party intent. For
the CISG, these are set forth in a deceptively simple provision
(Article 8).204 The rules in Article 8 have been the subject of
extensive scholarly analysis.205 Nonetheless, they are essential for
our purposes here and thus require a thorough review as a foundation for the analysis to follow.
1. The Hierarchy of Interpretation Under the CISG
The CISG’s rules for determining party intent diverge in fundamental respects from the traditional approach under U.S. domestic
law. Under the law of most U.S. states, a strict “objective theory”
governs issues of contract formation and interpretation.206 As one
state supreme court recently observed, “[t]he intent of the parties
can only be ascertained by an objective not subjective approach in
contract situations. The subjective intent of the parties is ordinarily
irrelevant.”207 Under this view, if a court determines that the
objective meaning of disputed words or conduct is clear, “[t]he circumstances surrounding the making of the contract, the purposes
which the parties sought to accomplish and their motives cannot
204. CISG, supra note 1, art. 8.
205. See, e.g., Martin Schmidt-Kessel, Article 8, in COMMENTARY ON THE UN CONVENTION
ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (CISG), supra note 40, at 143; Alberto Zuppi, Article
8, in UN CONVENTION ON CONTRACTS FOR THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (CISG), supra
note 44, at 142. For a detailed analysis of the role of Article 8’s interpretive rules specifically
in the contract formation process, see Van Alstine, supra note 15, at 42-46.
206. See, e.g., Hunter v. Reece, 253 P.3d 497, 501 (Wyo. 2011).
207. Id. (quoting Shrum v. Zeltwanger, 559 P.2d 1384, 1387 (Wyo. 1977)); see also S.
Healthcare Servs., Inc. v. Lloyd's of London, 110 So.3d 735, 744 (Miss. 2013) (“The most basic
principle of contract law is that contracts must be interpreted by objective, not subjective
standards. A court must effect a determination of the meaning of the language used, not the
ascertainment of some possible but unexpressed intent of the parties.” (quoting Simmons v.
Bank of Miss., 593 So.2d 40, 42-43 (Miss. 1992))); URI, Inc. v. Kleberg Cnty., 543 S.W.3d 755,
757 (Tex. 2018) (observing that in interpreting a written contract, “[o]bjective, not subjective,
intent controls” (quoting Matagorda Cnty. Hosp. Dist. v. Burwell, 189 S.W.3d 738, 740 (Tex.
2006))).
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prove an intent” that is contrary to that clear meaning.208 Closely
related to this objective, “plain meaning” approach is the parol
evidence rule. This substantive rule of contract law requires a court
to disregard evidence that is extrinsic to a final writing,209 and
especially prior negotiations between the parties, if the evidence
“might add to, vary, or contradict the writing.”210
The CISG rejects this approach in favor of a thoroughgoing search
for actual, not merely “objective,” intent. Under the influence of
continental European systems,211 CISG Article 8 adopts as the first
rule of interpretation that a court seek out and give effect to a
party’s subjective intent.212

208. See Retrofit Partners I, L.P. v. Lucas Indus., Inc., 201 F.3d 155, 161 (2d Cir. 2000)
(quoting Levine v. Massey, 654 A.2d 737, 741 (Conn. 1995)); see also RECP IV WG Land Invs.
LLC v. Capital One Bank (USA), N.A., 811 S.E.2d 817, 825 (Va. 2018) (“When the terms in
a contract are clear and unambiguous, the contract is construed according to its plain
meaning.”). Some U.S. jurisdictions, however, follow a more flexible interpretive approach
that is closer to continental European systems. The best example is New Jersey. See, e.g.,
Manahawkin Convalescent v. O’Neill, 85 A.3d 947, 959 (N.J. 2014) (“Even in the interpretation of an unambiguous contract, we may consider ‘all of the relevant evidence that will
assist in determining [its] intent and meaning.’” (alteration in original) (quoting Conway v.
287 Corp. Ctr. Assocs., 901 A.2d 341, 346 (N.J. 2006))); see also People v. Shelton, 125 P.3d
290, 294 (Cal. 2006) (recognizing the propriety of considering extrinsic evidence to determine
a party’s intent (citing Morey v. Vannucci, 75 Cal. Rptr. 2d 573, 578 (Cal. Ct. App. 1998))).
209. The Restatement refers to such a final writing as an “integrated agreement.” See
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 209 (AM. L. INST. 1981).
210. Williams v. Spitzer Autoworld Canton, L.L.C., 913 N.E.2d 410, 418 (Ohio 2009)
(quoting Bellman v. Am. Int’l Grp., 865 N.E.2d 853, 856-57 (Ohio 2007)); see also, e.g., Schron
v. Troutman Sanders LLP, 986 N.E.2d 430, 433 (N.Y. 2013) (“As a general rule, extrinsic
evidence is inadmissible to alter or add a provision to a written agreement. This rule gives
‘stability to commercial transactions by safeguarding against fraudulent claims, perjury,
death of witnesses ... infirmity of memory ... [and] the fear that the jury will improperly
evaluate the extrinsic evidence.’” (alteration in original) (quoting W.W.W. Assocs. v.
Giancontieri, 566 N.E.2d 639, 642 (N.Y. 1990))).
211. See, e.g., ALLGEMEINES BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [ABGG] [CIVIL CODE] § 914,
https://www.ris.bka.gv.at/GeltendeFassung.wxe?Abfrage=Bundesnormen&Gesetzesnumm
er=10001622 [https://perma.cc/6E9T-CXZT] (“In interpreting contracts, the intent of the
parties is to be determined rather than adhering to the literal meaning of its text.”) (Austria);
BÜRGERLICHES GESETZBUCH [BGB] [CIVIL CODE] § 133 (“In interpreting a declaration of
intent, the actual intent is to be determined rather than adhering to the literal meaning of
the declaration.”) (Ger.) [translations by Author].
212. See CISG, supra note 1, art. 8.
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a. The Primacy of Actual Intent
The primary principle of interpretation is set forth in the first
paragraph of Article 8. Under that provision, the statements and
conduct of a party “are to be interpreted according to his intent
where the other party knew or could not have been unaware what
that intent was.”213 In a clear rejection of classical Anglo-American
contract law, the interpretive process thus begins with a search for
a party’s actual intent. Of course, subjective intent is not relevant
“unless it is manifested in some fashion.”214 But if such external
evidence exists, the parties’ actual intent must prevail even if, as
one German court has explained, it deviates from the “objective
meaning” of their declarations.215
The primacy of actual intent extends beyond the interpretation
of a formal, written contract signed by both parties. It also broadly
governs the meaning of all “statements made by and other conduct
of a party.”216 Note the use of the singular here. The message is that
the required search for actual intent also applies to the questions of
whether and—more important for present purposes—the extent to
which a party has manifested its assent to contractual obligations.
Thus, even if it is clear that the parties have formed a contract, a
court must search for actual intent in determining whether a party
has agreed to specific contractual provisions proposed by the
other.217
Because it will commonly be difficult to prove what the other
party “knew,” the practically more important language of CISG
Article 8(1) is found in the words, “could not have been unaware.”218
The point of this language is that the other party may not hide
213. Id. art. 8(1). Because the negotiating process for the CISG occurred in the 1970s, it
should not surprise that the drafters used only male pronouns.
214. See UNCITRAL DIGEST, supra note 8, art. 8, para. 8, at 54. Nonetheless, even silence
or inactivity “may constitute a clear indication” of a party’s subjective intent based on past
practices between the parties. See Zuppi, supra note 205, at 147.
215. Oberlandesgericht Hamm [OLG] [Provencial Appellate Court], Nov. 12, 2001, 13 U
102/01 (Ger.), translation at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/011112g1.html [https://perma.cc/
6788-VGAG].
216. CISG, supra note 1, art. 8(1).
217. As I explain below, some U.S. courts have been especially insightful on this point. See
infra notes 354-62 and accompanying text.
218. See CISG, supra note 1, art. 8(1).

252

WILLIAM & MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 62:213

behind formal ignorance where, from past communications, prior
dealings, or other surrounding circumstances, it could not have been
in doubt about the actual intent of its contract partner. And indeed,
Article 8(3)—about which more immediately below219—requires a
court to consider all of the relevant circumstances, including prior
statements and conduct, in determining whether the other party
“could not have been unaware” of that actual intent.220 This of
course has special implications for the subject of our inquiry here:
one party’s purported agreement to foreign standard business
terms. As a blunt example—to provide a taste of the analysis to
come221—where a party has expressly insisted on its own standard
business terms as a condition to contracting, the mere performance
of the contemplated transaction can hardly leave the other party
“unaware” regarding the acceptance of its own, one-sided standard
business terms.
b. The Subsidiary Role of Objective Interpretation
The second paragraph of Article 8 then turns to the familiar
objective approach to interpretation. Under Article 8(2), the statements and conduct of a party are to be interpreted “according to the
understanding that a reasonable person of the same kind as the
other party would have had in the same circumstances.”222 As every
first-year law student learns, the reference to a “reasonable person”
is the formal way to express an “objective” approach to interpretation.223 To be sure, in practical terms the objective test of Article
8(2) will play the key role of interpretation in many cases.224

219. See infra Part III.B.1.c.
220. See CISG, supra note 1, art. 8.
221. See infra Part IV.A.
222. CISG, supra note 1, art. 8(2).
223. See Schmidt-Kessel, supra note 205, at 153; Zuppi, supra note 205, at 148-50.
224. Schmidt-Kessel, supra note 205, at 153. This commentator takes this factual point too
far, however. He wrongly asserts that “practically speaking Article 8(2) contains the principal
concept of interpretation” under the CISG. Id. Indeed, the commentator, principally in
reliance on interpretive norms of the domestic law of Germany, suggests that resort to Article
8(1) “is only necessary if the intent of the party ... does not correspond to the interpretation
under Article 8(2).” Id. at 152. This mysterious assertion directly contradicts the express
hierarchy in Article 8. See Zuppi, supra note 205, at 149.
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Nonetheless, as the provision itself reminds,225 the reasonable
person approach only applies when the interpretation of the actual
intent of a party under Article 8(1) “is not possible.”226
Thus, as courts in the United States have quite impressively
recognized, a court must first must examine all evidence of a party’s
actual, subjective intent before it may retreat to objective means of
interpretation.227 UNCITRAL’s official Digest of Case Law declares
the point directly: “Paragraphs 1 and 2 of article 8 set forth two sets
of criteria and a hierarchy for those criteria: the ones set forth in
article 8 (1) have to be resorted to primarily, before resorting to
those contained in article 8 (2).”228
c. The Required Consideration of Surrounding Circumstances
For the Anglo-American contract mind, the third paragraph of
Article 8 is perhaps the most jarring.229 This provision reinforces the
required search for actual intent by mandating consideration of all
relevant evidence.230 Thus, in an unmistakable rejection of the parol
evidence rule, Article 8(3) declares that in all interpretive inquiries
a court must consider “all relevant circumstances of the case.”231
To avoid any doubt, the provision expressly provides a list of the
possible “relevant circumstances.”232 Included here are “the negotiations, any practices which the parties have established between
themselves, usages and any subsequent conduct of the parties.”233
And, significantly, this list is merely illustrative, not exhaustive, as
the language “all relevant circumstances” alone makes clear.234
225. See CISG, supra note 1, art. 8(2) (declaring that the reasonable person approach
applies only “[i]f the preceding paragraph is not applicable”).
226. Zuppi, supra note 205, at 149.
227. See infra Part III.B.2.
228. UNCITRAL DIGEST, supra note 8, art. 8, para. 6, at 54.
229. Again, some jurisdictions are more flexible on this score, none more so than New
Jersey. See, e.g., Conway v. 287 Corp. Ctr. Assocs., 901 A.2d 341, 346-47 (N.J. 2006) (“We
consider all of the relevant evidence that will assist in determining the intent and meaning
of the contract.... ‘This is so even when the contract on its face is free from ambiguity.’”
(quoting Atl. N. Airlines v. Schwimmer, 96 A.2d 652, 656 (N.J. 1953))).
230. CISG, supra note 1, art. 8(3).
231. Id.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. See also UNCITRAL DIGEST, supra note 8, art. 8, paras. 22-30, at 56-57 (citing
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Thus, as a Swiss court has observed, the relevant evidence of intent
also may be found in “the interests of the parties, the purpose of the
contract, and the circumstances at the time of the conclusion of the
contract.”235
As I have explained elsewhere, the deliberations over this language during the drafting of the CISG “reveal a clear policy decision
to promote a flexible analysis of all circumstances that would reflect
on the intent of the parties,” and this includes, as “perhaps the most
indicative factor,” the precontractual statements of and other
negotiations between the parties.236 This of course carries a special
message for the subject of our analysis here: a claimed agreement
on the incorporation of standard business terms. As Part III.C will
examine in detail, numerous U.S. courts that have analyzed this
issue properly have placed a particular emphasis on whether the
parties discussed the terms during their contract negotiations.237
2. The Impressive Work of U.S. Courts
The U.N. Sales Convention, as a multilateral international treaty,
resulted from a multitude of compromises among countries with
vastly different legal, economic, and political perspectives.238 It thus
should little surprise that the Convention contains legal constructs
and concepts that may be quite unfamiliar to a common-law lawyer.
As we have just seen, there is perhaps no clearer example of this
than the CISG’s rules on the interpretation of party intent. Nonetheless, on this score U.S. courts have ample ground for pride, for

numerous court opinions).
235. Handelsgericht Aargau [HGer] [Commercial Court], Nov. 26, 2008, HOR.2006.79/AC/
tv, (Switz.), translation at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/081126s1.html [https://perma.cc/
JZ93-AFSQ] [alternative translation by Author].
236. See Van Alstine, supra note 15, at 45-46.
237. See VLM Food Trading Int’l, Inc. v. Ill. Trading Co., 811 F.3d 247, 253 (7th Cir. 2016)
(emphasizing that a disputed term “was never mentioned during any negotiations”); Roser
Techs., Inc. v. Carl Schreiber GmbH, No. 11cv302 ERIE, 2013 WL 4852314, at *9 (W.D. Pa.
Sept. 10, 2013) (holding that standard terms were not incorporated into a contract in part
because there was “no evidence that the parties had discussed incorporation of the standard
conditions during contract negotiations”); CSS Antenna, Inc. v. Amphenol-Tuchel Elecs.,
GmbH, 764 F. Supp. 2d 745, 754 (D. Md. 2011) (also so holding in part because the standard
terms “were never discussed during [the parties’] negotiations”).
238. See supra note 73.
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they have engaged in quite sophisticated analyses of the unfamiliar
rules of interpretation in CISG Article 8.
The first major case to confront the subject, MCC-Marble Ceramic
Center, Inc. v. Ceramica Nuova d’Agostino, S.p.A., also has become
the model.239 The dispute there involved a form document signed by
the buyer that included, on the reverse side, the seller’s standard
business terms.240 The buyer claimed, however, “that the parties
subjectively intended not to be bound by the terms on the reverse of
that form.”241 The district court nonetheless granted summary judgment in favor of the seller, reasoning that a clause on the front of
the form expressly incorporated the terms on the back.242
The Eleventh Circuit reversed, expressly on the foundation that
CISG Article 8(1) diverges from the strict objective approach in
domestic law.243 In language that since has become a model formulation of the point, the court declared:
Contrary to what is familiar practice in United States courts,
the CISG appears to permit a substantial inquiry into the parties’ subjective intent, even if the parties did not engage in any
objectively ascertainable means of registering this intent. Article
8(1) of the CISG instructs courts to interpret the “statements ...
and other conduct of a party ... according to his intent” as long
as the other party “knew or could not have been unaware” of
that intent. The plain language of the Convention, therefore,
requires an inquiry into a party’s subjective intent as long as the
other party to the contract was aware of that intent.244

Subsequent courts have fallen in line such that one now can
speak of a clear consensus on the matter. Indeed, over fifteen
opinions have relied expressly on MCC-Marble’s careful analysis to
conclude that the CISG requires a court, as a primary rule of
interpretation, to seek out and give effect to a party’s subjective
intent in contract formation.245 In the words of a New York federal
239.
240.
241.
242.
243.
244.
245.

144 F.3d 1384 (11th Cir. 1998).
Id. at 1385-86.
Id. at 1386.
See id. at 1385-86.
Id. at 1387, 1392-93.
Id. at 1387 (alteration in original) (footnote omitted).
For the most recent examples see Nucap Indus., Inc. v. Robert Bosch LLC, 273 F.
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court, CISG Article 8(1) “expresses a preference that ... intent be
considered subjectively.”246
U.S. courts have been equally impressive in recognizing the
Convention’s divergent approach to the consideration of surrounding circumstances. For one thing, it is now well established that
CISG Article 8(3) rejects the parol evidence rule in the interpretation even of final contractual writings.247 Courts also have correctly
recognized that prior statements, conduct, and negotiations may
play a significant role in interpreting a party’s intent more generally. As an Illinois federal court recently observed, “courts in this
district and around the country have determined that Article 8 of
the ‘CISG ... clearly instructs the court to admit and consider probative parol evidence regarding the parties’ negotiations inasmuch
as that evidence reveals the subjective intent of the parties.’”248
In sum, U.S. courts have recognized in subtle and sophisticated
ways that the U.N. Sales Convention adopts a quite flexible
approach to determining party intent. In specific, it rejects rigid
notions of “objective intent” as well as restrictive approaches to the
relevant evidence in interpretive inquiries. But what is perhaps
most impressive is that the courts have also seen that their analysis
of party intent has direct implications for the inclusion of standard
Supp. 3d 986, 1007-08 (N.D. Ill. 2017); Orica Austl. Pty. Ltd. v. Aston Evaporative Servs., LLC,
No. 14-cv-0412-WJM-CBS, 2015 WL 4538534, at *6 (D. Colo. July 28, 2015); Urica, Inc. v.
Pharmaplast S.A.E., No. CV 11-02476 MMM (RZx), 2014 WL 3893372, at *11 (C.D. Cal. Aug.
8, 2014); Allied Dynamics Corp. v. Kennametal, Inc., No. 12-CV-5904 (JFB)(AKT), 2014 WL
3845244, at *10 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 5, 2014).
246. Hanwha Corp. v. Cedar Petrochemicals, Inc., 760 F. Supp. 2d 426, 432 (S.D.N.Y.
2011); see also Roser Techs., Inc. v. Carl Schreiber GmbH, No. 11cv302 ERIE, 2013 WL
4852314, at *8 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 10, 2013).
247. See, e.g., Nucap Indus., 273 F. Supp. 3d at 1007-08; Kor. Trade Ins. Corp. v. Oved
Apparel Corp., No. 13-CV-07918 (DAB), 2015 WL 1345812, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 23, 2015);
Urica, 2014 WL 3893372, at *11; Weihai Textile Grp. Imp. & Exp. Co. v. Level 8 Apparel,
LLC, No. 11 Civ. 4405(ALC)(FM), 2014 WL 1494327, at *6 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 28, 2014). One
court recognized this point only a few years after the CISG entered into force. See Filanto,
S.p.A. v. Chilewich Int’l Corp., 789 F. Supp. 1229, 1238 n.7 (S.D.N.Y. 1992) (“[T]he Convention essentially rejects ... the parol evidence rule.”).
248. Nucap Indus., 273 F. Supp. 3d at 1007 (quoting Mitchell Aircraft Spares, Inc. v. Eur.
Aircraft Serv. AB, 23 F. Supp. 2d 915, 920 (N.D. Ill. 1998)); see also Ningbo Yang Voyage
Textiles Co. v. Sault Trading, No. 18-CV-1961 (ARR)(ST), 2019 WL 5399973, at *4 (E.D.N.Y.
Oct. 18, 2019) (observing that “‘unlike American contract law,’ the CISG ... ‘allows all relevant
information into evidence even if it contradicts the written documentation’” (quoting TeeVee
Toons, Inc. v. Gerhard Schubert GmbH, No. 00-CV-5189 (RCC), 2006 WL 2463537, at *7
(S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2006))).
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business terms in the contract formation process. The next Section
examines those implications.
C. The Special Treatment of Standard Business Terms
The “gravitational pull of uniformity” imposed by CISG Article
7(1) applies with particular force for subjects within the scope of,
but not expressly resolved in, the Convention.249 Like the battle of
the forms more generally,250 the incorporation of standard business
terms is one such subject.251 Indeed, foreign courts early on recognized that they must develop rules governing the incorporation of
standard business terms based on the principles in the CISG itself,
and in particular the interpretive norms in CISG Article 8.252 In
formal terms, this again is a “[q]uestion[ ] concerning matters governed by this Convention,”253 such that domestic law approaches are
irrelevant.254 Recognizing the interests of uniformity, U.S. courts
impressively now have followed the lead of foreign courts and have
adopted special rules for determining whether a party effectively
has made reference to its standard business terms in the course of
contract formation under the CISG.255

249. See supra Part III.A.
250. See supra notes 125-29 and accompanying text.
251. See Ferrari, supra note 123, at 287-89; Schroeter, supra note 115, at 364-65.
252. See, e.g., Oberlandesgericht [OLG] [Court of Appeals], Mar. 23, 2005, 6 R 200/04f
(Austria), translation at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/050323a3.html [https://perma.cc/
739H-544V]; Oberlandesgericht Düsseldorf [OLG] [Provincial Appellate Court], July 25,
2003, 17 U 22/03 (Ger.), translation at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/030725g1.html
[https://perma.cc/8XEP-3TQD]; Rb. Utrecht 21 januari 2009, HA ZA 08-1624 (GmbH/Quote
Foodproducts BV) (Neth.), translation at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/090121n1.html
[https://perma.cc/XH58-VJKT].
253. CISG, supra note 1, art. 7(2). One must distinguish here the incorporation of standard
business terms for purposes of contract formation from the question of their validity. See
CISG, supra note 1, art. 4(a) (providing that the CISG governs contract formation but “is not
concerned with ... [t]he validity of the contract or of any of its provisions”); see also
UNCITRAL DIGEST, supra note 8, pt. 2, para. 11, at 80 (citing cases).
254. See CISG ADVISORY COUNCIL, supra note 147, at 6 (“The inclusion of standard terms
under the CISG is determined according to the rules for the formation and interpretation of
contracts.”).
255. See infra Part III.C.2.
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1. Foreign Courts Take the Lead
Foreign courts began developing sophisticated approaches to the
incorporation of standard business terms under the CISG nearly
two decades ago. Once again, the courts of Germany and Austria
took the lead. The progenitor of modern doctrine on this score is a
2001 judgment of the German Federal Court of Justice
(Bundesgerichtshof ).256 Observing that the CISG has no special
provisions on how a party effectively may make reference to its
standard business terms in the contracting process, the court there
first determined that the issue “must be determined through interpretation according to Art. 8 CISG.”257 It then made clear that the
proponent of such terms must meet a high standard of clarity:
An effective incorporation of standard business terms first
requires that the recipient of the offer is able to recognize the
intent of the offeror to incorporate his terms into the contract....
The party proposing contract terms—which commonly run in his
favor—easily can attach the standard business terms to its offer.
Therefore, it would contradict the principle of good faith in
international trade (Art. 7(1) CISG) as well as the parties’
general obligations of cooperation and disclosure to impose on a
contract partner a duty of investigation with respect to terms
not sent to him and to burden him with the risks and disadvantages of unknown standard business terms of the other side.258

Thus, the court concluded, in order for a party to effectively
include standard business terms as part of its offer or proposed
acceptance, the other party “must have the possibility to take note
of them in a reasonable way.”259 The Austrian Supreme Court has
stated the point even more forcefully. “It is in the interests of both
parties and corresponds to the diligence of a faithful merchant as
256. BGH, Oct. 31, 2001, VIII ZR 60/01, https://openjur.de/u/62229.html [https://perma.cc/
A2QP-NTY9].
257. Id. para. 20 [translation by Author].
258. Id. para. 21 (citations omitted) [translation by Author]; see also Oberlandesgericht
[OLG] [Provincial Appellate Court], July 15, 2010, 13 U 54/10 (Ger.), translation at http://
cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/100715g1.html [https://perma.cc/J6MX-LG8J]; Oberlandesgericht
Düsseldorf [OLG] [Provincial Appellate Court], July 25, 2003, 17 U 22/03 (Ger.), translation
at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/030725g1.html [https://perma.cc/8XEP-3TQD].
259. BGH, Oct. 31, 2001, VIII ZR 60/02 para. 21 [translation by Author].
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well as the principle of good faith in business transactions,” the
court has declared, “that a party express itself to the other clearly
and precisely in order to avoid misunderstandings.”260 If, therefore,
a party desires to contract on the basis of standard terms that differ
in material respects from the otherwise-applicable law, “it is under
an obligation to state those terms clearly and in a way that makes
it possible for the other party to gain direct knowledge of their
content.”261
Other foreign courts have followed suit. In accordance with the
views of German and Austrian courts just described, it is now widely agreed that an attempted incorporation of standard business
terms in a contract declaration “must be sufficient to put a reasonable person of the same kind as the other party in a position to
understand the reference and to gain knowledge of the[m].”262
2. U.S. Courts Recognize Insights and Advance Uniformity
Courts in the United States likewise have deferred to the
interests of uniformity on the need for a special treatment of
standard business terms under the CISG. The court’s analysis in
Roser Technologies, Inc. v. Carl Schreiber GmbH is particularly

260. Oberster Gerichtshof [OGH] [Supreme Court] June 29, 2017, 8 Ob 104/16a (Austria),
https://www.ris.bka.gv.at/Dokument.wxe?ResultFunctionToken=f78e91a1-3906-4c7a-97d6d1adba7023a3&Position=1&Abfrage=Justiz&Gericht=&Rechtssatznummer=&Rechtssatz=
&Fundstelle=&AenderungenSeit=Undefined&SucheNachRechtssatz=False&SucheNachTe
xt=True&GZ=8Ob104%2f16a&VonDatum=&BisDatum=11.12.2017&Norm=&ImRisSeit=U
ndefined&ResultPageSize=100&Suchworte=&Dokumentnummer=JJT_20170629_OGH00
02_0080OB00104_16A0000_000 [https://perma.cc/S7VN-QJFA] [translation by Author].
261. Id. [translation by Author]; see also Oberster Gerichtshof [OGH] [Supreme Court] Dec.
17, 2003, 7 Ob 275/03x (Austria), translation at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/031217
a3.html [https://perma.cc/KBJ2-K348] (“[S]tandard terms, in order to be applicable to a
contract, must be included in the proposal of the party relying on them as intended to govern
the contract in a way that the other party under the given circumstances knew or could not
have been reasonably unaware of this intent.”).
262. UNCITRAL DIGEST, supra note 8, art. 8, para. 32, at 57 (citing numerous other cases);
see also Trib., 21 novembre 2007, n. 914/06 (It.), translation at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/
cases/071121i3.html [https://perma.cc/C8BK-ZZPZ]; Ulrich G. Schroeter, Article 14, in
COMMENTARY ON THE UN CONVENTION ON THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS (CISG), supra
note 40, at 268, at 294-303 (examining the clear majority view that the proponent of standard
business terms must “send their text or make it otherwise available” to the other party in a
reasonable way).
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impressive.263 There, the court began by expressly acknowledging
the requirement that a court give due consideration to prior
interpretations by foreign courts.264 The Roser court quoted in full
the now-accepted formulation of the relevant test in the 2001
judgment of the German Federal Court of Justice stated above.265
Following that lead, the court in Roser declared that “standard
conditions are only incorporated if one party attempts to incorporate
the standard conditions and the other party had reasonable notice
of this attempted incorporation.”266 It also quoted with approval a
similar formulation by the Austrian Supreme Court to the effect
that a party intending to rely on standard business terms must
include them with its contract proposal “in a way that the other
party under the given circumstances knew or could not have been
reasonably unaware of this intent.”267
Other U.S. courts have adopted this view as well. Indeed, one now
can comfortably speak of a consensus on the point, including with
particular reference to the determinative role of the interpretive
principles in CISG Article 8.268 The courts have identified a variety
of relevant factors on this score.269 But the essential point is that—

263. No. 11cv302 ERIE, 2013 WL 4852314 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 10, 2013).
264. Id. at *4 (“When [American Courts] interpret treaties, [they] consider the interpretations of the courts of other nations.” (alteration in original) (quoting Negusie v. Holder,
555 U.S. 511, 537 (2009) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part))).
265. See id. at *6; supra note 259 and accompanying text.
266. Id.
267. Id. at * 8.
268. See Allied Dynamics Corp. v. Kennametal, Inc., No. 12-CV-5904 (JFB)(AKT), 2014 WL
3845244, at *10 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 5, 2014) (citing CISG Article 8 and declaring that “[u]nder the
CISG, ‘standard conditions are only incorporated if one party attempts to incorporate the
standard conditions and the other party had reasonable notice of this attempted incorporation.’” (quoting Roser Techs., 2013 WL 4852314, at *6)); Roser Techs., 2013 WL 4852314,
at *8 n.8 (citing Article 8 for the same purpose); CSS Antenna, Inc. v. Amphenol-Tuchel
Elecs., GmbH, 764 F. Supp. 2d 745, 753 (D. Md. 2011) (same); TeeVee Toons, Inc. v. Gerhard
Schubert GmbH, No. 00-Civ.-5189(RCC), 2006 WL 2463537, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2006)
(same).
269. These include the clarity of the language purporting to incorporate the standard
terms; the extent of evidence that the other party had actual knowledge of the attempted
inclusion; the extent of the evidence that the parties discussed the terms during negotiations;
whether the other party actually received the terms; and whether the other party actually
signed or initialed the document attempting to incorporate the terms. See Allied Dynamics,
2014 WL 3845244, at *11; Roser Techs., 2013 WL 4852314, at *9; CSS Antenna, Inc., 764 F.
Supp. 2d at 753-54.
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in contrast to the domestic common law—a formulaic reference to
standard business terms alone will not suffice.270
The district court’s careful analysis in CSS Antenna provides a
model. There, a German seller expressly referred to its standard
business terms in response to various offers by a Maryland-based
buyer.271 The court nonetheless made clear that whether those references were effective in the contract formation process must be
determined under the interpretive standards of CISG Article 8.272 In
application of those standards, the court found that there was
insufficient evidence of an intent to include the standard terms
because the relevant language was “ambiguous at best,” the terms
“were never discussed” during the parties’ negotiations, and there
was no proof that the buyer “had actual knowledge” of them.273
Some U.S. courts, however, have wrongly left the impression that
the question of proposing standard business terms also solves the
broader issue of the battle of the forms.274 It does not. The analysis
of German and Austrian courts noted above, which U.S. courts
purport to follow, addresses the narrow question of whether a party
has effectively made reference to standard business terms in its
contract declaration (whether offer, acceptance, or counteroffer).275
This is a fundamentally different question from whether the other
party has agreed to their inclusion in the parties’ contract.
To be sure, the CISG’s flexible interpretive rules in Article 8
govern both issues. The subject of the two, however, is different: the
first focuses on the intent of the party proposing standard business
terms, the second on the intent of the other party to accept them.

270. Roser Techs., 2013 WL 4852314, at *8 (holding that a seller’s standard terms were not
incorporated notwithstanding an express reference to them and a link to them on the seller’s
website); CSS Antenna, 764 F. Supp. 2d at 754 (same); see also Nucap Indus., Inc. v. Robert
Bosch LLC, 273 F. Supp. 3d 986, 1006-09 (N.D. Ill. 2017) (denying summary judgment on the
incorporation of a seller’s standard business terms even though the buyer accepted numerous
offers that included an express reference to them and a link to a web page containing them).
271. CSS Antenna, 764 F. Supp. 2d at 747-48, 752.
272. See id. at 753.
273. Id. at 754. For similar analyses, see Roser Techs., 2013 WL 4852314, at *8; TeeVee
Toons, 2006 WL 2463537, at *7-8.
274. Even the Roser court curiously stated, in the course of analyzing standard business
terms, that the CISG adopts the last shot rule. 2013 WL 4852314, at *5.
275. See supra notes 247-52 and accompanying text.
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The latter issue is where the enduring dispute over the battle of the
forms is joined.
IV. THE UNIFIED FIELD SOLUTION TO THE BATTLE OF THE FORMS
UNDER THE CISG
The courts’ careful analysis of the CISG’s flexible interpretive
rules in the treatment of standard business terms examined above
provides a valuable foundation and context for our core purpose
here. Most important, it highlights the fact that conflicts over
standard business terms come in a broad array of types and circumstances: some may involve no real “battle” at all, for neither
party has made an effective reference to its standard business
terms; others, in contrast, will involve direct, irreconcilable
conflicts where both parties have insisted on the application of their
respective standard business terms. The rest are arrayed along a
factual spectrum, such that the resolution of the parties’ dispute will
turn decisively on the facts of each individual case.
This insight provides a foundation for a recognition that the
problem of the battle of the forms under the CISG requires a
nuanced approach, one that captures the full diversity of its subject
matter. It is precisely here that the Convention’s flexible principles
on contract formation play their essential role.
Section A below thus begins with an examination of those flexible
“formation values.” A careful appreciation of these flexible norms,
as Section B explains, makes clear that the proper solution to the
battle of the forms under the U.N. Sales Convention cannot be found
in any single rule. It is not that the prevailing last shot and knock
out rules are wrong in all respects; the problem, rather, is that each
is patently incomplete. The payoff comes in Section C. There, I
explain how the CISG’s flexible values permit, indeed require, a nuanced approach that is comprehensive in scope, but individualized
in application.
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A. The Convention’s Flexible Formation Values
1. Recalling the Problem, Setting the Stage
Contractual obligations arise from consent—in traditional idioms,
from a mutual manifestation of assent by two willing parties. The
same is true under the CISG: Articles 14 and 18 are premised on the
traditional vehicles of offer and acceptance, and embedded in both
is a requirement of assent.276
Unfortunately, the modern phenomenon of standard business
terms scrambles these concepts in operation.277 The parties may of
course negotiate directly and reduce the entirety of their agreement
to a single, final document. The goal of preformulated, standard
terms, however, is precisely to circumvent negotiation and permit
one party to impose its contractual will without the formal agreement of the other.278 The parties nonetheless commonly do not view
such terms as an impediment to the conclusion of a deal. If their
writings agree on the business aspects (price, goods, performance
time), they simply perform the contemplated transaction (the seller
ships, the buyer pays).
In the absence of standard business terms, the CISG’s basic offeracceptance formation scheme will accurately capture the parties’
shared intent in the great run of cases. Thus, if an offer279 proposes
only terms specifically prepared for an individual transaction and
the offeree simply accepts,280 no serious question of shared intent is
likely to arise. If the offeree raised no objection to terms specifically
tailored to the transaction at issue, there should be little room for
an argument that its unqualified conduct does not manifest agreement to a contract on that basis.281 The same is true if the individually prepared terms in a reply materially differ from those in the

276. See CISG, supra note 1, arts. 14(1), 18(1) (providing in Article 14(1) that an offer must
“indicate[ ] the intention of the offeror to be bound in case of acceptance” and requiring in
Article 18(1) that a valid acceptance “indicat[e] assent to [the] offer”).
277. See supra Part II.B.
278. See supra Part II.B.
279. See CISG, supra note 1, art. 14(1).
280. See id. art 18(1).
281. For a more detailed analysis of this point, see infra Part IV.C.3.
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offer,282 and the original offeror (the new counterofferee) then
simply accepts the resulting counteroffer (whether expressly or by
unqualified performance).
The challenge arises when one or both of the parties effectively
propose standard terms. Of their very nature, such terms are
drafted in advance for repeat use, have no reference to any specific
transaction, and do not result from individualized negotiation. The
UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts—a
form of international “restatement” of the law governing such
contracts—thus valuably defines such terms as ones that are
“prepared in advance for general and repeated use by one party and
which are actually used without negotiation.”283 Where the parties
refer to such terms as a matter of routine, their intent in any
specific transaction becomes murky, in particular if the parties
nonetheless perform the contemplated deal without further
discussion.
The problem, as we have seen, is that the CISG does not have an
express rule that governs the formation process in such a situation.
As Part III.B above examined in detail, the CISG rejects the rigid
interpretive rules of Anglo-American common law in favor of a
flexible and thoroughgoing search for a party’s actual intent. The
courts, as Part III.C then explained, have properly recognized that
these flexible norms also govern whether a party has included
standard business terms in its contract declaration (offer or purported acceptance)—that is, whether a party has effectively proposed
standard business terms. The next stage in sophistication is to
recognize that these rules also determine whether the parties have
agreed to those terms.
Appeals to the “structural” elements of contract formation cannot
advance the analysis on this score. The concepts of offer and acceptance tell us only how parties may form a contract, not whether they
have done so in a particular case or what the terms of that contract
are. The answer instead lies in the deeper values that animate the
contract formation process.
282. See CISG, supra note 1, art. 19(1), (3).
283. UNIDROIT INT ’ L INST. FOR THE UNIFICATION OF PRIV. L., UNIDROIT PRINCIPLES OF
INTERNATIONAL COMMERCIAL CONTRACTS, art. 2.1.19(2), at 67 (2016), https://www.unidroit.
org/instruments/commercial-contracts/unidroit-principles-2016 [https://perma.cc/4X8C-PRPP].
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2. Flexible Interpretive Norms Require a Flexible Solution
For the U.N. Sales Convention, those values are found in two
fundamental principles. First, Article 6 declares the primacy of
“party autonomy,” that is, that the agreement of the parties takes
precedence, even over the express provisions of the Convention.284
The second is more important, for it controls the operation of the
first: CISG Article 8 sets forth flexible standards for interpreting
party intent, that is, for determining precisely what that agreement
is.285 Part III.B analyzed these flexible standards in general terms;
the next step is to recognize their decisive role in resolving battles
of the forms.286
The flexible values at the foundation of the CISG’s contract formation scheme alone permit a statement of a fundamental principle:
there is no one-size-fits-all solution to the battle of the forms under
the CISG. Whether the parties have agreed on the incorporation of
standard business terms in their contract will turn on the facts of
each specific case. This may cause frustration for some courts, for it
makes their job more cumbersome (especially in the civil jury
system of the United States). The flexible interpretive principles of
Article 8 nonetheless preclude generalizations, and indeed reject the
notion that the resolution of the battle of the forms could be found
in a single, rigid rule at all.287
Of course, business considerations may compel a party to agree
to the standard terms proposed by the other.288 In the absence of an
express agreement, however, the primary principle of interpretation in CISG Article 8(1), as we have seen, is a subjective one.289
Thus, a party’s actual intent with respect to foreign standard terms
must prevail if the proposing party “knew or could not have been
unaware” of that intent.290 And in answering this question, the
284. See supra notes 67-73 and accompanying text.
285. See supra Part III.B.
286. As a subsidiary norm, CISG Article 11 reinforces the mandate of flexibility by rejecting all formal or evidentiary requirements for concluding a contract. See CISG, supra note 1,
art. 11 (“A contract of sale need not be concluded in or evidenced by writing and is not subject
to any other requirement as to form. It may be proved by any means, including witnesses.”).
287. See id. art. 8.
288. See infra Part IV.C.2.
289. See supra Part III.B.1.
290. See CISG, supra note 1, art. 8(1).
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flexible interpretive norms of the CISG require the court to consider
all relevant circumstances of the case.291 Specifically, as we have
seen, Article 8(3) mandates that a court examine “all relevant
circumstances,” including in particular the prior negotiations, any
established practices, and even subsequent conduct of the parties
involved in each specific transaction.292 A myopic focus on conduct
as the sole source of interpretive evidence has no place here.
Nuance and flexibility are required even under the subsidiary,
objective “reasonable person” test in Article 8(2). This standard will
apply when the search for actual intent does not yield sufficient
evidence such that the other party “could not have been unaware”
of that intent.293 But here as well, the CISG rejects rigid assumptions about a party’s intent with respect to terms proposed by the
other. Indeed, recall that Article 8(3) expressly provides that for
the subsidiary “reasonable person” test of Article 8(2) as well, a
court must consider “all relevant circumstances of the case,” and
this (again) includes the parties’ prior dealings and respective
interests, the purpose of the transaction, and the specific circumstances surrounding the conclusion of the contract.294
The distilled message is that whether a party has agreed to
proposed standard business terms under the CISG is an intensely
factual inquiry, one that will depend decisively on the facts of each
individual case. And to state an obvious point, the idiosyncrasies of
human interaction will mean a wide array of expectations, intentions, and perspectives in responding to standard business terms.
The proper way to conceive of the resolution of the battle of the
forms under the CISG, therefore, is as a spectrum arrayed by
differences of factual degree, not of legal category. Section C below
will examine this spectrum in detail. Before doing so, however, I
first will explain more fully why the leading approaches to the battle
of the forms fail, each in its own way, to capture the nuance
required by the CISG’s flexible formation values.
291. See supra Part III.B.1.c.
292. See supra CISG, supra note 1, art. 8(3) (“In determining the intent of a party ... due
consideration is to be given to all relevant circumstances of the case including the negotiations, any practices which the parties have established between themselves, usages and
any subsequent conduct of the parties.”).
293. Id. art. 8(1).
294. See supra Part III.B.1.c.

2020]

THE UNIFIED FIELD SOLUTION

267

B. The Inadequacy of the Existing Approaches
Both the last shot and the knock out approaches to the battle of
the forms under the CISG claim fidelity to its contract formation
scheme: the former simply relies on its formal, structural provisions
(Articles 14, 18, and 19),295 the latter on deeper values of party
autonomy and the primacy of actual intent (Articles 6 and 8).296
Careful analysis reveals, however, that these two “competing”
approaches in fact are not in conflict. Rather, they simply focus on
different points—different subsets of cases—along the same factual
spectrum.
More generally, neither approach is capable of providing a comprehensive solution to the battle of the forms. The fundamental
problem is that each proceeds from a stylized assumption about how
parties express contractual agreement. Such assumptions are highly
suspect even for a single jurisdiction (such as the United States)
with shared cultural and legal traditions. They approach the absurd
when applied to a multilateral treaty such as the CISG, which
governs cultural, linguistic, political, and legal communities as
diverse as Argentina, Bulgaria, Congo, Russia, China, and the
United States.297
1. The Last Shot Approach
The last shot rule is particularly problematic in this respect. To
be sure, in practical application, CISG Article 19 embraces the
traditional mirror image rule.298 The latter rule is not the same as
the former, however, and nothing leads inexorably from one to the
other. Unfortunately, some courts have nonetheless conflated the
two. The Seventh Circuit in VLM Food Trading International, Inc.
v. Illinois Trading Co. thus stated that “the Convention ... us[es] the
common-law ‘mirror image’ rule (sometimes called the ‘last shot’
rule) to resolve ‘battles of the forms.’”299 The basic statement here
295. See supra Part II.C.1.
296. See supra Part II.C.2.
297. See Status: United Nations Convention, supra note 3.
298. See supra notes 111-17 and accompanying text.
299. 811 F.3d 247, 251 (7th Cir. 2016) (quoting VLM Food Trading Int’l, Inc. v. Ill. Trading
Co., 748 F.3d 780, 785-86 (7th Cir. 2014)). As noted above, see notes 163-65 and accompanying
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is correct; the parenthetical and the overarching point decidedly are
not.
The fundamental flaw of the last shot approach is that it is
indifferent to, or even actively disregards, the actual intent of the
parties.300 With an appeal to supposed certainty, it simply imposes
a result whenever the parties proceed to perform: the last shot wins
entirely. It is of course entirely possible that a party may expressly
accept an offer or counteroffer (including standard business terms)
or that subsequent conduct will reflect a party’s implied agreement
to the same effect. When this happens, the result, descriptively, is
that the last shot wins, and to that extent, the last shot approach
accurately captures a subset of cases.
When stated as a “rule,” however, it wildly overclaims. To be sure,
conduct subsequent to a counteroffer—typically, when the seller
delivers and the buyer pays—indeed will reflect an agreement on
the formation of a contract.301 But whether that conduct “indicat[es]
assent”302 beyond the essential terms reflected in that conduct,
including with respect to foreign standard business terms, must be
determined under the flexible interpretive rules of CISG Article 8.303
And this, again, will depend on “all relevant circumstances” of each
case,304 including especially the prior statements and dealings of the
text, a few other courts, with little or no analysis, have claimed that the CISG adopts a last
shot rule. See Arsape S.A. v. JDS Uniphase Corp., No. C 03-04535 JW, 2006 WL 8442164, at
*4 (N.D. Cal. June 15, 2006) (“[T]he CISG provides for a ‘last-shot’ rule.”); see also Roser
Techs., Inc. v. Carl Schreiber GmbH, No. 11cv302 ERIE, 2013 WL 4852314, at *5 (W.D. Pa.
Sept. 10, 2013) (“Commentators have noted that Article 19 is an embodiment of the mirror
image rule.... Thus ... [t]he terms of the contract are those embodied in the last offer (or
counteroffer) made prior to a contract being formed.”).
300. This too is at the foundation of the flawed statements that the CISG embraces the last
shot “rule.” E.g., VLM Food Trading, 811 F.3d at 251 (stating that under the CISG “[t]he
terms of the contract are those embodied in the last offer (or counteroffer) made prior to a
contract being formed” (emphasis added) (quoting Roser Techs., 2013 WL 4852314, at *5)).
Because the last shot rule imposes a result irrespective of actual intent, I long ago referred
to it as the “fictional assent” rule. See Van Alstine, supra note 15, at 67-72.
301. See infra Part IV.C.3.
302. See CISG, supra note 1, art. 18(1).
303. See UNCITRAL DIGEST, supra note 8, art. 18, para. 5, at 94 (declaring that Article 19
determines whether a reply to an offer constitutes a counteroffer, but that “[w]hether a
counter-offer is accepted is then determined by article 18”); id. para. 3, at 94 (stating that
whether the statement or conduct of a party indicates assent to an offer “is subject to interpretation in accordance with the rules of paragraphs (1) and (2) of article 8”).
304. See CISG, supra note 1, art. 8(3); supra Part III.B.1.c.
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parties. In this respect, the last shot rule collapses under the weight
of its own rigidity.
There is perhaps no better example of this error than Allied
Dynamics Corp. v. Kennametal, Inc.305 The court in that case cited
the interpretive principles in CISG Article 8, but then inexplicably
found, with no analysis, that a buyer accepted a seller’s standard
business terms simply because “it did not object to them within
fifteen days” as required by the terms themselves.306 For one thing,
this reasoning directly conflicts with the specific rule governing an
acceptance in CISG Article 18(1).307 What is more important for
present purposes is that it disregards the general mandate in CISG
Article 8 that the court seek out and give effect to the parties’ actual
intent under the circumstances.308
2. The Knock Out Approach
The knock out approach to the battle of the forms suffers from a
different malady, but fails for a similar reason. Although often billed as the “competing” view to the last shot rule, it formally applies
only to the narrow subset of “true” battles of the forms (this describes a situation in which both parties effectively propose
standard business terms, but carry out the contemplated transaction despite the conflict between the two sets of terms).309 As
described in Part II.C above, the knock out view reasons that in
such a case each party (at least impliedly) has objected to the terms
proposed by the other. The result is that the contract consists only
of the terms that are in substantive agreement.310
Again, to this extent, the knock out rule may well capture a
subset of cases. When stated as a “rule,” however, it has a quite
narrow scope. For one thing, it has little to say about the numerous
305. No. 12-CV-5904 (JFB)(AKT), 2014 WL 3845244 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 5, 2014).
306. Id. at *11-12. Norfolk Southern Railway Co. v. Power Source Supply, Inc., No. 06-58
J, 2008 WL 2884102 (W.D. Pa. July 25, 2008), is similarly flawed. There, the court applied
what was in effect a last shot rule without any analysis of—indeed, without any reference
to—the flexible interpretive principles required by CISG Article 8. See id. at *7.
307. CISG Article 18(1) expressly provides that “[s]ilence or inactivity does not in itself
amount to acceptance.” CISG, supra note 1, art. 18(1).
308. See id. art. 8.
309. See supra Part II.C.2.
310. See supra Part II.C.2.
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cases in which only one party effectively incorporates standard
business terms in its contract declaration (whether offer or acceptance). It likewise does not account for situations in which one party
previously had agreed to some or all of the standard business terms
proposed by the other. Instead, it seems to impose a result without
regard to the parties’ actual shared or individual intent.
C. A Flexible Solution for a Diverse Spectrum
At this point, it should be abundantly clear that the proper way
to conceive of the enduring controversy over the battle of the forms
under the CISG is as a spectrum of factual cases whose resolution
must be found in the distinct facts of each individual dispute and
not in the rigid application of an all-purpose rule. The proper
solution instead begins with a recognition that the flexible formation values examined in Section A above apply across the full
spectrum of agreement processes in modern international contracting. The distilled essence of these values is that courts must
undertake an active search for the parties’ actual intent and must
consider all surrounding circumstances in doing so. This alone
precludes stylized assumptions based on notions of last shot or
mutual knock out.
These two leading approaches to the battle of the forms nonetheless have a role to play. Indeed, each may well be correct, as a
descriptive matter, for a subset of factual cases. The problem is that
neither is sufficient on its own, for neither captures the full
complexity of the battle of the forms in modern commercial transactions.
The proper solution thus incorporates the positive aspects of these
approaches, but recognizes the existence of the broader and substantially more diverse spectrum. In this final Section, I examine
this “unified field solution” to the battle of the forms under the
CISG. As I explain below, the CISG’s flexible formation values
provide the uniform principles that apply across the full spectrum
of cases. Though comprehensive in scope, however, the values are
individualized in application—that is, they permit, indeed require,
a case-specific analysis of whether, and if so to what extent, the
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parties in fact have agreed to contracting terms proposed in the
course of their negotiations.
For ease of exposition, the analysis will proceed on the basis of
five standard transaction types arrayed along the factual spectrum,
from those involving no real dispute to those that present true
battles between conflicting forms. The types, however, are merely
an expedient for analysis, and should not divert attention from the
overarching concept of a spectrum. That is, although we may profitably group cases based on factual commonalities, it is important
to emphasize from the outset that the types do not represent rigid
categories. Rather, the factual boundaries of each will flow into
those of its neighbors.
1. No Forms, No Battle
Some cases on the spectrum involve no battle over standard
business terms at all. This arises where the parties in fact never
reach a contractual agreement or, if they do, neither party’s standard terms become part of the contract. In the great run of these
situations, the CISG’s simple offer-acceptance scheme will adequately capture the contracting process.
At one extreme, conflicts over standard business terms will
prevent the formation of a contract in the first place. Hanwha Corp.
v. Cedar Petrochemicals, Inc. provides an example.311 There, the
parties had an active dispute over the choice-of-law clauses in their
respective standard terms.312 This dispute derailed their negotiations entirely, and they did not perform the contemplated deal (even
though they had done so in twenty previous transactions).313
Applying the mirror image rule of CISG Article 19, the court found
that, even under the flexible interpretive principles in Article 8,
neither party had an intent to be bound in the absence of an
agreement on the applicable body of law.314 Ultimately, no battle
arose over which set of terms took precedence, because the parties’

311.
312.
313.
314.

760 F. Supp. 2d 426 (S.D.N.Y. 2011).
Id. at 428.
Id. at 429.
Id. at 432-33.
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dispute on the subject served as an obstacle to the formation of any
contract at all.315
Standard business terms also do not create a battle of the forms
if they are first introduced after the parties form a contract. Thus,
for example, in Chateau des Charmes Wines Ltd. v. Sabaté USA
Inc.,316 a seller forwarded its standard business terms after the
parties had already concluded an oral contract for the sale of wine
corks, but the buyer later performed its side of the deal.317 The court
held that the seller’s action at best could be an attempt to modify
the contract under CISG Article 29.318 It declared, however, that
“[n]othing in the Convention suggests that the failure to object to a
party’s unilateral attempt to alter materially the terms of an otherwise valid agreement is an ‘agreement.’”319 Numerous other courts,
both domestic and foreign, have held likewise.320
A similar factual circumstance can exist even when standard
business terms are in play prior to contract formation. It is here
that the courts’ sophisticated analysis of the incorporation of such
terms, as examined in Part III.C above, assumes its essential role.
Recall that, following the lead of their German and Austrian
counterparts, U.S. courts have held that a party effectively includes
such preformulated terms of business in its contract declaration
(whether offer or acceptance) only if the other party had “reasonable
notice” of this intent.321 The result of that analysis may well be that

315. Id.; see also Orica Austl. Pty. Ltd. v. Aston Evaporative Servs., LLC, No. 14-cv-0412WJM-CBS, 2015 WL 4538534, at *6 (D. Colo. July 28, 2015) (concluding that a dispute over
standard business terms precluded summary judgment on whether the parties had an intent
to be bound to contractual obligations).
316. 328 F.3d 528 (9th Cir. 2003).
317. Id. at 529-31.
318. Id. at 531.
319. Id.
320. VLM Food Trading Int’l, Inc. v. Ill. Trading Co., 811 F.3d 247, 253-54 (7th Cir. 2016);
Solae, LLC v. Hershey Can., Inc., 557 F. Supp. 2d 452, 457-58 (D. Del. 2008); Hof van Beroep
[HvB] [Court of Appeal] Gent, Nov. 8, 2004, 2001/AR/1982 (Belg.), translation at http://cisgw
3.law.pace.edu/cases/041108b1.html [https://perma.cc/UY2H-KB5B]; Rechtbank van Koophandel [Kh.] [Commerce Tribunal] Tongeren, Jan. 25, 2005, A.R. A/04/01960 (Belg.),
translation at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/050125b1.html [https://perma.cc/2L6J-27MY];
Chateau des Charmes Wines Ltd., v. Sabaté, USA, Inc., 2005 CanLII 39869 (Can. Ont. S.C.);
Hof’s-Hertogenbosch 29 mei 2007, C051069/HE (Neth.), translation at http://cisgw3.law.
pace.edu/cases/070529n1.html [https://perma.cc/75JM-FBSN].
321. See supra Part III.C.2.
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neither party effectively makes reference to its standard business
terms during the negotiation process.
Roser Technologies, Inc. v. Carl Schreiber GmbH—a leading authority on the subject in U.S. courts—itself provides a good example.322 There, the court found that the buyer did not effectively
refer to any standard terms in its offer and that, in application of
the “reasonable notice” test, the seller likewise did not do so in its
purported acceptance.323 The result was that standard business
terms ultimately were not relevant to the analysis of the contract
formation process under the CISG.324 What nonetheless remained
was the seller’s counteroffer based on a payment term that “was in
regular print on the front” side of its order confirmations.325 The
court thus found that the buyer impliedly accepted that express
term by subsequently performing the contemplated transaction
without objection.326
In all of the cases at this end of our factual spectrum, no battle of
the forms ultimately arises. Without that complication, the CISG’s
standard provisions on offer and acceptance, including the mirror
image rule of Article 19, should apply with little controversy. Thus,
where a party expressly and clearly includes terms in the formal
text of its offer or counteroffer document—as was the case in
Roser—a court may well conclude that subsequent performance by
the other party without objection reflects an acceptance under CISG
Article 18(1).
2. One Form, Express Acceptance
Moving along the factual spectrum, we begin to confront cases
that raise the potential for an actual battle over standard business
terms. The first zone here, however, is entirely unproblematic, for
322. No. 11cv302 ERIE, 2013 WL 4852314 (W.D. Pa. Sept. 10, 2013).
323. Id. at *9.
324. Id. at *9-11. To the same effect is CSS Antenna, Inc. v. Amphenol-Tuchel Electronics,
GmbH, 764 F. Supp. 2d 745, 754 (D. Md. 2011); see also Nucap Indus., Inc. v. Robert Bosch
LLC, 273 F. Supp. 3d 986, 1006-09 (N.D. Ill. 2017) (denying a motion for summary judgment
due to factual disputes over whether a party effectively included its standard business terms
in a contract declaration); TeeVee Toons, Inc. v. Gerhard Schubert GmbH, No. 00-Civ.-5189
(RCC), 2006 WL 2463537, at *7-8 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 23, 2006) (same).
325. Roser Techs., 2013 WL 4852314, at *9-11.
326. Id.
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it involves one party’s express acceptance of standard business
terms proposed by the other. An opinion by an Italian court
illustrates the point.327 There, a seller’s order confirmation included
standard business terms that materially altered the terms of the
buyer’s order and thus reflected a counteroffer under CISG Article
19.328 Then, however, an authorized representative of the buyer
signed and returned a copy of the seller’s standard business
terms.329 The court unsurprisingly found that the buyer’s act of
signing without objection reflected an express agreement to the
seller’s terms.330 Courts in the United States have found likewise
when one party signed or initialed foreign business terms as part of
its agreement to an offer or counteroffer,331 and when there was no
credible evidence of an intent to reject some or all of those business
terms.332
Cases in this zone of our spectrum may even involve an actual
battle of the forms, that is, a situation in which each party effectively refers to its standard business terms during the contract
formation process. If one party then expressly accepts the standard
terms of the other for inclusion in the contract, the legal analysis
under the CISG is straightforward: although the battle is joined, one
party agrees to settle the dispute by express agreement.
327. See Tribunale di Rovereto, 21 Novembre 2007, n. 914/06 (It.), translation at http://
cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/071121i3.html [https://perma.cc/TN7W-AV4U].
328. Id.
329. Id.
330. Id. (holding that even if the buyer had effectively referred to its own standard business
terms as part of its offer, the result would have been the same).
331. See BTC-USA Corp. v. Novacare, Civil No. 07-3998 ABM/JSM, 2008 WL 2465814, at
*3-4 (D. Minn. June 16, 2008) (holding that a buyer became bound to the seller’s standard
business terms when an authorized representative initialed them, even though the parties
had previously concluded an oral contract); Tyco Valves & Controls Distrib. GmbH v. Tippins,
Inc., No. CIV A 04-1626, 2006 WL 2924814, at *5-6 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 10, 2006) (holding that a
seller accepted the buyer’s standard business terms when an authorized representative signed
each page).
332. In contrast, careful analysis of the background facts may reveal an understanding that
the act of signing did not reflect an intent to agree to certain terms. Thus, for example, in
MCC-Marble Ceramic Center, Inc. v. Ceramica Nuova d’Agostino, S.p.A., 144 F.3d 1384, 138586 (11th Cir. 1998), a buyer signed a form containing the seller’s standard business terms.
The Eleventh Circuit nonetheless reversed a grant of summary judgment because the district
court had failed to consider the prior negotiations of the parties to determine whether the
buyer in fact had agreed to all of those terms. Id. at 1391-92. For more on this point, see infra
Part IV.C.4.
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3. Last Shot’s Domain: Implied Acceptance
The last shot approach has a role to play under the CISG. That
role, however, is decidedly not as a “rule” imposed on the parties;
rather, it is a factual description of how, in some deals, the parties
agree to resolve a battle of the forms. This factual zone in our
spectrum involves an effective reference to standard business terms
by one—in some cases even both—of the parties to an international
sale of goods transaction. The careful, comprehensive examination
of party intent required by CISG Article 8 nonetheless reveals that
one party has impliedly agreed to accept the terms proposed by the
other.333
These are cases in which a party fails to manifest its intent to
reject foreign standard business terms. Recall that the primary rule
of interpretation under CISG Article 8(1) is that a party’s actual
intent prevails “where the other party knew or could not have been
unaware” of that intent.334 However, this inquiry requires sufficient
evidence of a party’s subjective intent to put the other party on at
least constructive notice of what that intent was.335 Failing that, the
subsidiary objective approach to interpretation in CISG Article 8(2)
will protect the reasonable understandings of the other party in the
contract formation process.336
This may arise when a party proceeds to perform a transaction in
the face of standard business terms actively proposed by the other
(whether as part of an original offer or a counteroffer under CISG
Article 19). In any such case, if the party fails, in a sufficient way,
to insist on the application of its own contracting terms, to object to
those proposed by the other, or to otherwise make known what its
actual intent was, the reasonable interpretation of its conduct in
performing the deal may well be that it has accepted those foreign
business terms. To be sure, Article 8(3) requires consideration of all
surrounding circumstances, including the prior negotiations of the

333. See supra Part III.B.
334. See CISG, supra note 1, art. 8(1); supra Part III.B.1.a.
335. See UNCITRAL DIGEST, supra note 8, art. 8, para. 8, at 54 (observing that a party’s
subjective intent must be “manifested in some fashion” (citing cases)).
336. See Schmidt-Kessel, supra note 205, at 153-54 (advocating aggressively for such a
perspective).
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parties;337 but in this zone along our factual spectrum, the last shot
approach may well accurately describe the reasonable interpretation
of party intent in the formation of a contract under the CISG.
Indeed, even the Supreme Court of Austria has recognized this
point. In a 2005 opinion, the court found that a seller had agreed to
the buyer’s standard business terms by accepting the related purchase order without objection.338 Two facts were of particular
significance for the court: first, in the specific transaction at issue
“the [buyer] provided its standard business terms before the
beginning of negotiations [and] expressly referred to them not only
in a written confirmation of oral negotiations but in a written
amendment”; and second, thereafter “the [seller] accepted the order
in writing without objecting to the [buyer’s] standard business
terms or referring to its own terms” even though it “continuously”
had referred to its own terms in prior transactions.339 Thus, the
court found that the seller simply had accepted the buyer’s order,
including the standard business terms, under CISG Article 18(1).340
Courts in the United States have held likewise where one party
insisted on the application of its standard business terms and the
other proceeded to perform the deal without objection.341
The same result may obtain even where both parties effectively
refer to their respective standard business terms in a specific transaction. An opinion by an Austrian appellate court provides a
valuable illustration.342 There, a buyer incorporated its standard
business terms (SBT) into its initial offer in the specific transaction
at issue, but then did not refer to them at all in later correspondence

337. See CISG, supra note 1, art. 8(3).
338. Oberster Gerichtshof [OGH] [Supreme Court] Nov. 29, 2005, 4 Ob 205/05h (Austria),
translation at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/051129a3.html [https://perma.cc/E53B-6HVH].
339. Id. [translation by Author].
340. Id.
341. Allied Dynamics Corp. v. Kennametal, Inc., No. 12-CV-5904 (JFB)(AKT), 2014 WL
3845244, at *12 (E.D.N.Y. Aug. 5, 2014) (finding, although with little analysis, that a buyer
accepted a seller’s standard business terms by not timely objecting to them before performance); Golden Valley Grape Juice & Wine, LLC v. Centrisys Corp., No. CV F 09-1424 LJO
GSA, 2010 WL 347897, at *1, *3-5 (E.D. Cal. Jan. 22, 2010) (holding that a U.S. buyer accepted the standard business terms of an Australian seller where it received the full text of
the terms by email and then performed the contemplated transaction without objection).
342. Oberlandesgericht [OLG] [Court of Appeals] Mar. 23, 2005, 6 R 200/04f (Austria),
translation at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/050323a3.html [https://perma.cc/3EM8-U7DA].
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with the seller.343 In contrast, the seller “referred to the application
of its SBT in all further writings,” including in the formal reply to
the buyer’s offer, and also “expressly objected to the application of
the SBT of the [buyer] in all respects.”344 This, the court correctly
found, constituted a counteroffer under CISG Article 19(1).345 Noting
that the buyer thereafter performed the contemplated deal without
objection, and without ever again referring to its own standard
business terms, the court concluded—in application of the interpretive rules in CISG Article 8—that the buyer “impliedly accepted the
counteroffer of the [seller] which included its SBT.”346
A last shot approach may have special validity when a disputed
contract term is highlighted in the core contracting terms of an offer
or reply, and thus is not buried in preprinted, standard business
terms. Indeed, even the German Federal Court of Justice—the
foremost proponent of the knock out approach under the CISG—
emphasized this point in a 2015 opinion.347 That case involved a
German seller that had included an express choice-of-forum clause
on the front of an offer to a Cypress-based buyer.348 Although it
formally accepted the offer, the buyer argued that the parties’ actual
intent was reflected in the fact that prior transactions between the
parties did not include any agreement on the subject.349 The court
rejected that argument, reasoning that the choice-of-forum clause

343. Id. para. 6.2.
344. Id. [translation by Author].
345. Id. para. 4.2.
346. Id. para. 6.2 [translation by Author]; see also Oberlandesgericht Frankfurt [OLG]
[Provincial Appellate Court], June 26, 2006, 26 Sch 28/05 (Ger.), translation at http://cisg
w3.law.pace.edu/cases/060626g1.html [https://perma.cc/VX8P-7LJH] (giving effect to the standard terms of one party because it had declared that it would contract “exclusively” on the
basis of those terms and the other party then performed the deal without objection); cf.
Handelsgericht [Commercial Court] June 15, 2010, HG.2009.164 (Switz.), http://ww2.gerichte.
sg.ch/home/dienstleistungen/rechtsprechung/kantonsgericht/entscheide_2010/hg_2009_164.
html [https://perma.cc/Q9FC-3UE5] (holding, without further analysis, that a buyer accepted
a counteroffer of a seller, including the incorporated standard business terms, when it opened
a contemplated letter of credit without objection).
347. Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Court of Justice], Mar. 25, 2015, VIII ZR 125/14
(Ger.), http://www.cisg-online.ch/content/api/cisg/urteile/2588.pdf [https://perma.cc/7JZD3C72].
348. Id.
349. Id.
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“was conspicuously set forth on the front side of [the offer’s] ‘specifications’ and within the core terms of the offer.”350
As a descriptive matter, in each of these examples the party that
sent the last form prevailed. In each, however, the court arrived at
its conclusion only after a careful examination of party intent under
the surrounding circumstances. This is precisely what is required by
the CISG’s flexible interpretive norms.351
4. The Need for Nuance and the Search for Actual Intent
Moving along our factual spectrum, we enter a zone that thus far
has almost entirely escaped the attention of scholars and courts
alike. At issue here are situations in which a party has accepted a
formal offer or counteroffer (whether expressly or impliedly) that
includes foreign standard business terms, but argues that it did not
have an intent to accept some or all of those terms. Although
drowned out by the clashes over last shot and knock out, this factual
zone may actually be the most common and significant in battle of
the forms disputes.
It is in this zone that the search for actual party intent required
by CISG Article 8 plays its most significant role. But it is also the
zone that presents the greatest challenge for an unthinking common
law judge. Under the common law, notions of “mirror image” and
“last shot” flow naturally from a stylized conception of an acceptance
as an all-or-nothing proposition. Once a contract is thus formed,
exaggerated versions of objective interpretation and the parol
evidence rule then severely constrain any attempt to identify actual
intent.
The CISG, in contrast, obligates a court to undertake an active
search for actual intent, even in the case of a “last shot” containing
standard business terms.352 Even here, the required active search
350. Id. para. 40 [translation by Author].
351. Although rare, a party also may impliedly agree to standard business terms through
a trade usage or established party practice under CISG Article 9(1). Oberster Gerichtshof
[OGH] [Supreme Court] Aug. 31, 2005, 7 Ob 175/05v (Austria), translation at http://
cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/050831a3.html [https://perma.cc/E4ZD-EP85] (holding that a seller
was bound by a buyer’s standard business terms through an established practice under CISG
Article 9(1) after it agreed to them in four previous transactions).
352. See supra Part III.B.1.
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for actual intent may reveal that the other party did not accept,
whether in whole or in part, those proffered standard business
terms. And in this undertaking, CISG Article 8(3) requires the court
to consider “all relevant circumstances of the case,” including the
dealings, negotiations, and other interactions between the parties
prior to the conclusion of the contract.353
Although little noticed, some U.S. courts have taken these principles to heart and engaged in a quite sophisticated analysis of
whether a party in fact accepted standard business terms proposed
by another. An excellent example is TeeVee Toons, Inc. v. Gerhard
Schubert GmbH.354 The TeeVee Toons court confronted a situation
in which a German seller and a U.S. buyer entered into a written
contract that attached the seller’s standard business terms.355 When
a dispute later arose over the quality of the sold goods, the seller
sought to invoke certain warranty disclaimers set forth in its standard business terms.356 Although the buyer had formally accepted
the related offer, it claimed that the parties had extensive discussions both before and after the contract was formed to the effect that
some or all of the seller’s standard terms would not have effect.357
After carefully analyzing CISG Article 8’s rules of interpretation,
the court highlighted its obligation to seek out the buyer’s subjective
intent under the circumstances.358 Thus, it declared,
Under the CISG ... any statements made between [the parties]
that contradict the written “Terms and Conditions,” or that
indicate that the “Terms and Conditions” section as a whole is
not part of the final agreement between the parties, must be
considered in deciding what is part of the [final] Contract.359

On this basis, the court refused to grant summary judgment in favor
of the seller even though, again, its standard business terms were
a formal part of the offer accepted by the buyer.360
353.
354.
355.
356.
357.
358.
359.
360.

CISG, supra note 1, art. 8(3).
No. 00 Civ. 5189(RCC), 2006 WL 2463537 (S.D.N.Y Aug. 23, 2006).
Id. at *1, *4, *6.
Id. at *6.
Id. at *6-7.
Id. at *7-8.
Id. at *7.
See id. at *9.
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The required search for active intent may even reveal that a party
did not agree to a specific term in standard business terms otherwise incorporated in a contract. Thus, for example, the court in
Nucap Industries, Inc. v. Robert Bosch LLC refused to grant summary judgment based on substantial evidence that a seller did not
agree to a specific provision in over eight thousand purchase orders
sent by a buyer.361 The essential issue, the court emphasized, was
whether the buyer “knew or could not have been unaware” of the
seller’s intent not to agree to that provision.362
A specific standard business term may be excluded from a
contract in this way even under the subsidiary, “objective” standard
of interpretation of CISG Article 8(2). A 2008 opinion of a German
court illustrates the point.363 There, a German buyer and an Italian
seller had an express agreement on a specific location for the
performance of a sales contract, but the seller later sent and the
buyer signed standard business terms that stipulated a different
location.364 In such a clear case, the court dispensed with an examination of subjective intent and turned directly to the buyer’s
reasonable expectations under the circumstances.365 The relevant
standard for the inclusion of a specific standard term under CISG
Article 8(2), the court concluded, is one of unreasonable surprise,
that is, “whether the term so clearly diverges from the expectations
of the other party that it could not reasonably have expected that
the term would be included” in the contract through the foreign
standard business terms.366 Because that was the case with the
standard term at issue there, the court enforced the parties’ prior
express agreement.367
This opinion provides an apt capstone to our analysis of this zone
in the spectrum. The CISG’s flexible interpretive principles require
an active search for intent under the specific circumstances

361. 273 F. Supp. 3d 986, 1007-09 (N.D. Ill. 2017).
362. Id. at 1008.
363. Landgericht Landshut [LG] [District Court], June 12, 2008, 43 O 1748/07 (Ger.), translation at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/080612g2.html [https://perma.cc/XF9K-N8XY].
364. Id.
365. See id.
366. Id. [translation by Author].
367. Id.; see also UNCITRAL DIGEST, supra note 8, art. 8, para. 31, at 57 (stating the same
standard).
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surrounding the parties’ deal. This active search may reveal that
the other party “knew or could not have been unaware” of an intent
not to accept foreign business terms or even that a reasonable
person would have recognized such an intent. The same applies
when the foreign business terms were included in the “last shot”
that led to the formation of a contract.
5. Knock Out’s Domain: A Battle Truly Joined
The far end of our factual spectrum involves cases in which a
battle of the forms is well and truly joined. In this zone, each party
effectively incorporates standard business terms in its contract
declaration (whether offer or acceptance) as discussed above368 and
continues to insist on their application prior to contract formation.
In such a situation, there is no principled reason to give preference
to the terms of either party, and certainly not based solely on the
fortuity of which sends its form last.
The place to begin the analysis here is with a reminder: because
commercial parties routinely refer to their respective standard
business terms, the result in the great run of cases, as we have seen,
is that their exchange of forms will not create a contract under CISG
Article 19.369 Notwithstanding this formal legal result, the parties
commonly proceed to perform the contemplated deal, oblivious to—
or in knowing disregard of—the conflicts between their respective
standard terms.
It is precisely here that the fundamental formation values of the
CISG play their essential role. After the parties have performed the
essential elements of a sales transaction, they clearly have manifested an agreement on the existence of a contractual relationship,
and the principle of party autonomy in Article 6 will give effect to
that agreement.370 The only question is the content of such a
contract. As we have noted, the parties’ conduct will demonstrate an
agreement on those matters reflected in the performance (most important, identification of the goods and performance time through

368. See supra Part III.C.
369. See supra notes 121-23 and accompanying text.
370. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
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shipment and acceptance, and of the price through payment).371 The
remainder of the contract, including with reference to the proposed
standard business terms, then raises a core issue of party intent.
And this, of course, requires application of the flexible interpretive
rules in CISG Article 8.372
As Part III.B explained in detail, the primary principle of
interpretation in CISG Article 8(1) is a subjective one.373 Thus, a
party’s actual intent with respect to foreign standard terms must
prevail if the proposing party “knew or could not have been unaware” of that intent.374 Where both parties refer to their respective
standard business terms in the contracting process and then continue to insist on their application prior to performance, this
interpretive inquiry in very large measure will answer itself. As a
simple business matter, a party has every reason not to accept a
comprehensive set of one-sided, generally quite unfavorable standard terms proposed by the other. And there can be little room for
doubt on this score where the party separately has insisted on the
application of its own standard terms. In such a case, the other
party must know, or at a minimum will have ample grounds to be
aware of, the actual intent of its contract partner not to accept
foreign standard business terms. Of course, in the case of a true
battle of the forms, the reverse is true as well.
A review of the circumstances of such a case thus commonly will
reveal that neither party could be “unaware” of the intent of the
other under the primary, subjective rule of interpretation in CISG
Article 8(1). But the outcome will commonly be the same under the
subsidiary, “reasonable person” test of CISG Article 8(2) as well.375
Where a party has insisted on its own standard terms, a reasonable
person under the circumstances could hardly conclude—based solely
on narrow performance of shipment or payment—that the party

371. See CISG, supra note 1, art. 14(1) (providing that an offer is “sufficiently definite” if
it indicates the goods and at a minimum makes provision for determining the quantity and
the price); id. art. 23 (providing that a contract is formed when acceptance of the offer becomes
effective).
372. See supra Part III.B.
373. In particular, see supra Part III.B.1.a.
374. CISG, supra note 1, art. 8(1).
375. See supra Part III.B.1.b.
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nonetheless has an intent to accept the one-sided terms proposed by
the other.
Such cases are the domain for the knock out rule. Where both
parties have demanded application of their respective terms, an
examination of the facts will commonly demonstrate that neither
had an intent to accept the standard terms of the other. The content
of the contract that results solely from the parties’ conduct, then,
can only be constructed on the basis of the actual agreement
between them. Beyond the essential terms revealed by actual
performance of the deal, this includes the terms on which their
respective forms overlap in substance (likely quite limited) as well
as any usages or practices otherwise agreed upon by the parties.376
It is only to this extent that the parties have agreed to “derogate
from or vary the effect of” the CISG under the principle of party
autonomy declared in Article 6.377 The background provisions in the
CISG will apply to define the remainder of the parties’ contractual
rights and obligations.378
As I have noted above, the German Federal Court of Justice has
been the leading proponent of this knock out approach to true battle
of the forms cases.379 In its Powdered Milk opinion noted above, the
Court addressed a situation in which a buyer and a seller both referred to their respective standard business terms, but the parties
performed the deal without further discussion.380 The Federal Court
of Justice found that through their conduct the parties nonetheless
formed a contract based on the party autonomy principle in CISG
Article 6.381
The more enduring facet of the court’s opinion, however, was on
the content of that contract, and on this the Federal Court of Justice
376. See HONNOLD, supra note 121, at 252; Schroeter, supra note 115, at 369; Van Alstine,
supra note 15, at 90; see also CISG, supra note 1, art. 9(1) (“The parties are bound by any
usage to which they have agreed and by any practices which they have established between
themselves.”).
377. CISG, supra note 1, art. 6.
378. See HONNOLD, supra note 121, at 252; Schroeter, supra note 115, at 372; Van Alstine,
supra note 15, at 91.
379. See supra notes 179-80 and accompanying text.
380. See Bundesgerichtshof [BGH] [Federal Supreme Court], Jan. 9, 2002, VIII ZR 304/00
(Powdered Milk Case) (Ger.), translation at http://cisgw3.law.pace.edu/cases/020109g1.html
[https://perma.cc/THU2-N8YC].
381. Id.
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provided the now-classic statement of the knock out rule: “standard
business terms that partially differ from each other become part of
the contract (only) to the extent that they do not conflict; otherwise,
the default legal rules apply.”382 As noted, this formulation has since
found support in other foreign courts and a clear majority of legal
commentators.383
Courts in the United States have not yet had an occasion to
address a case that squarely falls in this final zone of our spectrum.
Nonetheless, one can find in some opinions promising seeds of the
sophistication necessary to recognize the propriety of the knock out
approach in true battle of the forms situations. Nucap Industries,
briefly noted above,384 is particularly impressive in this respect.
That case involved a claim by a buyer (Bosch) that a seller of brake
components (Nucap) had agreed to its standard business terms,
including a provision that transferred certain intellectual property
rights of the seller.385
The court founded its analysis of the parties’ deal squarely on the
flexible interpretive rules in CISG Article 8.386 In specific, it declared
that Articles 8(1) and 8(3) “permit[ ] consideration of evidence of the
parties’ negotiations and subsequent conduct to determine whether
they mutually ... intended to incorporate a term when the contract
was formed.”387 The essential issue, the court held, was whether
Bosch “knew or could not have been unaware” of Nucap’s intent not
to agree to the intellectual property provision in Bosch’s standard
business terms.388 Citing evidence of the prior negotiations of the
parties, the court refused to grant summary judgment on the enforceability of that provision.389
382. Id. [translation by Author].
383. See supra notes 188-90 and accompanying text.
384. See supra notes 361-62 and accompanying text.
385. Nucap Indus., Inc. v. Robert Bosch LLC, 273 F. Supp. 3d 986, 993 (N.D. Ill. 2017).
386. See id. at 1007-08.
387. Id. (citing VLM Food Trading Int’l, Inc. v. Ill. Trading Co., 811 F.3d 247, 253 (7th Cir.
2016)).
388. Id. at 1008.
389. Id. at 1008-09; cf. Mia. Valley Paper, LLC v. Lebbing Eng’g & Consulting GmbH, No.
1:05-CV-00702, 2009 WL 818618, at *7 (S.D. Ohio Mar. 26, 2009) (declaring in a dispute over
the quality of the sold goods that “[u]nder Articles 8 and 11 of the CISG, witness testimony
may be considered to determine the terms of the contract and this consideration presents
issues of fact which must be determined at trial”).
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MCC-Marble Ceramic Center, Inc. v. Ceramica Nuova d’Agostino,
S.p.A.390—the progenitor of much of the sophisticated analysis by
U.S. courts of party intent under the CISG391—contains similar
promising insights. At issue there was the enforceability of a seller’s
standard business terms printed on the reverse side of a document
actually signed by the buyer.392 The court nonetheless declared that
“Article 8(1) of the CISG requires a court to consider ... evidence of
the parties’ subjective intent” in interpretive inquiries.393 After an
extensive analysis of CISG Article 8(3), the court then reversed a
grant of summary judgment because the district court had failed to
consider the prior negotiations of the parties in determining whether the buyer in fact had agreed to those terms.394 Other U.S. courts
likewise have recognized the primacy of subjective intent in analyzing whether a party has agreed to standard business terms in the
contract formation process.395
It is but a small step from these insights to a recognition that a
court must examine the parties’ respective subjective intent in
“true” battle of the forms situations. Where each party has insisted
on the application of its standard business terms, neither can claim
to be “unaware” of the other’s actual intent not to accept conflicting
terms. When, then, the parties nonetheless proceed to perform their
contemplated deal, the content of the resultant contract exists only
in the expressive content of their conduct and the actual agreement
between their respective forms (as supplemented by the background
rules of the Convention).
CONCLUSION
A system of contract law reveals its essential values in the norms
governing how contractual obligations come into being in the first

390. 144 F.3d 1384 (11th Cir. 1998).
391. See supra notes 239-46 and accompanying text.
392. See MCC-Marble, 144 F.3d at 1387-88.
393. Id. at 1388.
394. Id. at 1388-92.
395. See, e.g., CSS Antenna, Inc. v. Amphenol-Tuchel Elecs., GmbH, 764 F. Supp. 2d 745,
753-54 (D. Md. 2011) (denying a motion to dismiss based on a forum selection clause in a
party’s standard business terms because of factual issues over whether the other party
actually agreed to that specific clause).
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place. For the U.N. Sales Convention, those values are reflected in
the twin principles that the parties’ agreement comes first (“party
autonomy”) and that a court must undertake a thoroughgoing
search to determine what the parties’ actual agreement is.396 Taken
together, these flexible formation values provide all of the tools necessary for a comprehensive resolution to the enduring controversy
over the “battle of the forms” under the CISG.
I have explained here that the proper way to conceive of the battle
of the forms is as a spectrum of diverse, particularized relationships. Seen in this way, there can be no single “right” answer.
Rather, the solution requires an individualized application of the
flexible formation values that unify the Convention’s contract
formation scheme. I have described this comprehensive approach as
the “unified field solution” to capture the notion that a single set of
principles applies across the full spectrum of agreement processes.
In recent years, courts in the United States have recognized, in
quite sophisticated ways, the significance of the Convention’s flexible rules for determining party intent. In specific, they have recognized that the required search for actual intent governs whether a
party effectively has proposed standard business terms. Although
thus far unnoticed, this development also sets the foundation for a
more thoughtful analysis of the core question in the battle of the
forms: whether, and to what extent, the parties in fact have agreed
to those terms. This final stage of sophistication is achieved by
recognizing that the U.N. Sales Convention both enables and
requires a flexible interpretive approach that accommodates the
diverse, nuanced reality of modern international contracting.

396. CISG, supra note 1, arts. 6, 8.

